




Three Essays Evaluating Health Impacts of the
National School Lunch Program
Janet Peckham
Clemson University, jgemmil@clemson.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Nutrition Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation









THREE ESSAYS EVALUATING HEALTH IMPACTS  









In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 









Dr. Thomas A. Mroz, Committee Chair 
Dr. Jaclyn D. Kropp 
Dr. Daniel P. Miller 




This research focuses on the health impacts of participation in the National School Lunch 
Program, a program providing free and reduced-cost lunches for income-eligible students 
and minimally subsidizing lunches for income-ineligible students. In the past decade, 
increasing incidence of childhood obesity, particularly among low-income individuals 
has drawn scrutiny over the NSLP’s role in the health of student-aged children. 
The first chapter introduces the reader to the NSLP, providing a history of the program 
since its inception at the turn of the 20th century and addressing current issues in the 
economic literature regarding health impacts of program participation. The second 
chapter examines four econometric models estimating the effect of NSLP participation on 
obesity and finds mixed results.  
Much of the previous literature assumes that all NSLP participants receive nutritionally 
equivalent meals, regardless of school or student characteristics. The third and fourth 
chapters use novel datasets to investigate the validity of this assumption. Chapter Three 
examines menu offerings of the NSLP across school districts, highlighting variability in 
menu composition across income levels. Chapter Four addresses factors affecting 
students’ selection of the daily entrée, including race, gender, age, and income-eligibility. 
Key results include: 1) students attending wealthier school districts are offered more 
entrees, fruits and vegetable choices per week, possibly resulting in nutritionally superior 
meals; 2) students receiving free lunches are more likely than students purchasing paid-
price lunches to choose entrees with more fat and carbohydrates and less protein. 
iii 
DEDICATION 
“In every walk with Nature one receives far more than he seeks.” 
- John Muir 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It is with great pleasure that I express appreciation to my wonderful family, friends, and 
colleagues whom have helped me through this process again. Without their continued 
support, encouragement, and guidance, I would not have considered becoming a PhD 
student. Thank you, Mom and Dad, for forcing me to attend Sylvan Learning Center after 
I struggled through seventh grade algebra. I thank my officemates Ling, Zhixin, and 
Caroline for coffee breaks, late night advice, and excellent gossip. My husband Chris 
often had more faith in my abilities than I did; without him I could not have succeeded. 
Chris, thank you for everything you did to support me mentally, spiritually, physically, 
emotionally, and financially. I extend my deepest thanks to my daughter Frances, for 
being the world’s most agreeable infant. Your endless smiles motivated me to continue; 
your long naps gave me the time I needed to finish.   
I would also like to thank my advisor, Tom Mroz, and my committee members, Jaclyn 
Kropp, Dan Miller and Dave Willis, for their constructive comments and patience with a 
process that always took longer than expected. Thank you for pushing me to produce a 
dissertation I am proud of. I am grateful that Tom Mroz, Jaclyn Kropp, Ellen Granberg, 
and Vivian Haley-Zitlin supported my interests in the school lunch program through my 
research assistantship and continued participation in the CBBS Health Grant initiatives. 
Lastly, I thank Nikki Hawthorne for helping me better understand the role of a Food and 
Nutrition Services director and providing access to Point of Sale data. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................... i 
 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... ii 
 
DEDICATION  ............................................................................................................... iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iv 
 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... vii 
 




 I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1 
 
   Program History ....................................................................................... 6 
   Current NSLP Reimbursements ............................................................. 14 
 
 II. ARE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PARTICIPANTS MORE  
   LIKELY TO BE OBESE?  SELECTION AND   
   IDENTIFICATION ISSUES ................................................................. 20 
 
   Introduction ............................................................................................ 20 
   Literature Review ................................................................................... 22 
   Data ........................................................................................................ 26 
   Measuring the Effect of Participation .................................................... 30 
   Summary and Conclusions .................................................................... 45 
 
 III. WHAT’S FOR LUNCH? DETERMINANTS OF 
   NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM MENUS ....................... 59 
 
   Introduction ............................................................................................ 59 
   Literature Review ................................................................................... 61 
   Theory .................................................................................................... 64 
   Data ........................................................................................................ 67 




Table of Contents (Continued) 
 
   Page 
 
   Results .................................................................................................... 76 
   Conclusion ............................................................................................. 84 
 
 
 IV. DOES INCOME EFFECT STUDENTS’ CHOICE OF ENTRÉE 
   WITHIN NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM 
   MENUS? .............................................................................................. 110 
 
   Introduction .......................................................................................... 110 
   Theory and Methods ............................................................................ 113 
   Data ...................................................................................................... 118 
   Results .................................................................................................. 121 
   Conclusion ........................................................................................... 128 
 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 139 
 
 A. National School Lunch Program Weekly Meal Pattern ............................. 140 
 
 B. State Policies .............................................................................................. 141 
 
 C. Results for Vegetable Subgroups ............................................................... 143 
 
 D. Additional Income Specifications .............................................................. 156 
 
 E. Joint F Tests ............................................................................................... 168 
 
 F. School Menu Example ............................................................................... 170 
 
 G. Entrée Nutritionals ..................................................................................... 171 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 174 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
 
 1.1 NSLP Subsidy Rates .................................................................................... 18 
 
 2.1 Variables ...................................................................................................... 48 
  
 2.2 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................... 49 
  
 2.3 OLS Regression Results .............................................................................. 51 
  
 2.4 Recursive Bivariate Probit Model Results  .................................................. 54 
  
 2.5 Non-Parametric Bounds ............................................................................... 56 
  
 2.6 Regression Discontinuity Results ................................................................ 56 
 
 3.1 Variables ...................................................................................................... 87 
 
 3.2 District Demographics ................................................................................. 89 
 
 3.3 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................... 90 
 
 3.4 Variety of Vegetables Offered Weekly ........................................................ 91 
 
 3.5 Model 1, Income Polynomial ....................................................................... 92 
 
 3.6 Model 2, Natural Log of Income ................................................................. 94 
 
 3.7 Model 3, Income Dummy Variables ............................................................ 96 
 
 3.8 Model 4, Eligible ......................................................................................... 98 
 
 3.9 Model 5, Eligible Dummy Variables ......................................................... 100 
 
 3.10 Model 6, Median Regression using Income ............................................... 102 
 




List of Tables (Continued) 
 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
 
 4.1 Student Demographics ............................................................................... 131 
 
 4.2 Food Energy and Nutrients ........................................................................ 132 
  
 4.3 Nutritional Value of Top 5 Purchased Entrees .......................................... 132 
 
 4.4 Conditional Logit Results .......................................................................... 133 
  
 4.5 OLS Regression Results ............................................................................ 135 
 
 4.6 Joint F Tests for Indicator Variables .......................................................... 137 
 
 A.1 Weekly Meal Pattern for Kindergarten to Fifth Grade .............................. 140 
 
 B.1 State Nutrition Policies by Region ............................................................. 141 
 
 C.1 Model 1, Vegetable Subgroups .................................................................. 143 
 
 C.2 Model 2, Vegetable Subgroups .................................................................. 145 
 
 C.3 Model 3, Vegetable Subgroups .................................................................. 147 
 
 C.4 Model 4, Vegetable Subgroups .................................................................. 149 
 
 C.5 Model 5, Vegetable Subgroups .................................................................. 151 
 
 D.1 Additional Income Specifications, Total Entrees and  
   Total Fruit ............................................................................................ 156 
 
 D.2 Additional Income Specifications, Total Vegetables and  
   Green Vegetables ................................................................................. 159 
 
 D.3 Additional Income Specifications, Red/Orange Vegetables and  





List of Tables (Continued) 
 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
 
 D.4 Additional Income Specifications, Starchy Vegetables and  
   Other Vegetables .................................................................................. 165 
 
 E.1 Joint F Tests for Total Entrée, Total Fruit, and  
   Total Vegetable .................................................................................... 168 
 
 G.1 Food Energy and Nutrients for All Entrees ............................................... 171 
  
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                             Page 
 
 1.1 NSLP Participation, 1969 – 2012 ................................................................ 19 
 
 1.2 NSLP Costs Per Lunch Served, 1969 – 2012 .............................................. 19 
 
 2.1 Validity of Using Income as Monotone Instrumental Variable ................... 57 
  
 2.2 Obesity Indicator by Income/Poverty Ratio ................................................ 57 
  
 2.3 High Percent Body Fat Indicator by Income/Poverty Ratio ........................ 58 
  
 2.4 Large Waist to Height Indicator by Income/Poverty Ratio ......................... 58 
 
 3.1 Data Collection Issues by Income Strata ................................................... 106 
 
 3.2 Measuring Income ..................................................................................... 106 
 
 3.3 Histogram of Outcome Variables .............................................................. 107 
 
 3.4 Distribution of Vegetable Subgroups ......................................................... 107 
 
 3.5 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Entrees Offered Weekly ....................................................................... 108 
 
 3.6 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Fruits Offered Weekly ......................................................................... 108 
 
 3.7 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Vegetables Offered Weekly ................................................................. 109 
 
 4.1 Total Number of Lunches Purchased Per Student, 




List of Figures (Continued) 
 
Figure                                                                                                                             Page 
 
 4.2 Food Energy and Nutrients by Entrée ........................................................ 138 
 
 C.1 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Dark Green Vegetables Offered Weekly ............................................. 153 
 
 C.2 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Red/Orange Vegetables Offered Weekly ............................................. 153 
 
 C.3 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Legumes Offered Weekly .................................................................... 154 
 
 C.4 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Starchy Vegetables Offered Weekly .................................................... 154 
 
 C.5 Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
   Other Vegetables Offered Weekly ....................................................... 155 
 








The National School Lunch Program (NSLP) provides free and reduced-cost lunches for 
eligible students, as well as minimally subsidizing paid lunches for students that are not 
eligible. Students with household incomes of 130 percent of the poverty line or less are 
eligible for the free lunch. Students with household incomes between 130 percent and 
185 percent of the poverty line are eligible for the reduced-price lunch. Students with 
household incomes over 185 are income-ineligible but may purchase a “full-price” lunch; 
roughly 32 percent of all lunches served fall in this category (Food and Nutrition Service 
2013a). More than eighty percent of all primary and secondary schools choose to 
participate in the program, serving over 5 billion lunches annually to 31 million children 
in pre-kindergarten through 12th grade (Currie 2003; Food and Nutrition Service 2013a). 
Recently, economists and nutritionists have investigated the relationship between 
negative health outcomes (such as high sodium intake or large Body Mass Index (BMI)) 
and participation in the NSLP, citing rising obesity levels among school-age children a 
cause for concern. Is the positive correlation between BMI participation in the NSLP the 
result of high calorie, high fat school lunches? Or is the positive correlation due to 
selection bias into the program? While studies have concluded that NSLP participants 
consume more calories, fats, and sodium at lunch than non-participants (Bhattacharya, 
Currie, & Haider 2004; Campbell et al. 2011; Gleason & Suitor 2003; Hanson & Olson 
2013), the relationship between participation and obesity remains murky. Research by 
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Millimet, Tchernis, and Husain (2010) and Schanzenbach (2009) suggest a positive 
relationship while research by Gunderson, Kreider & Pepper (2012) and Gleason and 
Dodd (2009) suggest a negative relationship between participation and obesity. 
My dissertation is comprised of three papers. The first, “Are National School Lunch 
Program Participants More Likely to be Obese? Selection and Identification Issues,” 
provides a summary and critique of the current literature on the causal effects of 
participation in the NSLP on obesity. Using data from the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES), I estimate the treatment effect of participation in the 
NSLP on three measures of obesity (BMI, percent body fat, and waist to height ratio) 
applying four methods seen in the literature: 1) ordinary least squares regression, 2) 
recursive bivariate probit model, 3) non-parametric monotone instrumental variable 
(MIV) approach, and 4) regression discontinuity. The results are equivocal: treatment 
effects calculated with the first two models are positive; treatment effects with models 
three and four are negative. The causal relationship between participation in the NSLP 
and rates of childhood obesity remains unclear, partly due to concerns about the validity 
of each model. The simplistic OLS regression does not account for the endogeneity of 
participation, however the more complex bivariate probit model requires a valid 
instrument to correctly identify the causal effect and results may depend heavily on the 
strong distributional assumptions. Models three and four require the assumption of 
conditional mean monotonicity in order to estimate an average or local average treatment 
effect. This assumption is not supported by the data, thus invalidating the nonparametric 
MIV bounds and possibly the fuzzy regression discontinuity results.  
 
 3 
Model validity is not the only issue in the current economic literature. A second issue not 
addressed is understanding how and what “participation” is measuring. For my analysis 
described above, I define a participant as a student that purchases school lunch five days 
a week.1 However, other studies have defined a participant as loosely as a student that 
“usually” purchases lunch. This vagueness is due in part to a difference in survey 
question. The NHANES survey to parents asks if a child ever purchases a school lunch 
and if so, how many. The Early Childhood Longitudinal Study: Kindergarten Cohort 
(used in Millimet, Tchernis, & Husain 2010 and Schanzenbach 2009) asks parents if a 
child “usually” purchases a school lunch; participants answer in the affirmative but do 
not tell how often they purchase a lunch. This makes comparing results from different 
authors challenging.  
Moreover, what is participation in the NSLP measuring? It is serving as a proxy for 
consumption of a qualifying meal. Using participation as a proxy for consumption 
requires the inherent assumption that all school lunches provide equivalent levels of 
nutrition. While there are federal guidelines mandating minimum nutrition standards, 
school lunches are not equal across all school districts in all states. One reason for this is 
the differences among cafeteria kitchens. The majority of schools are equipped with a full 
kitchen in which to prepare meals but some schools rely on off-site kitchens or pre-made 
meals (Gordon et al. 2007). School finances can contribute to the type of meal provided 
as well. While all schools are given the same federal reimbursements per meal, additional 
state and local revenue can be allocated to food services to increase the quality or 
                                                
1 The results changed little when this is reduced to include 4 or 5 days a week.   
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quantity of food choices. Once a menu is set, students are able to choose among different 
entrees, fruits, vegetables, milk, and grains offered on a given day. For example, in the 
2004/05 school year, the median number of different entrees served per day was three; 18 
percent of schools offered six or more entrees (Gordon et al. 2007). Thus, the nutritional 
value of a qualifying school lunch can vary across and within school districts. The second 
and third papers in my dissertation try to address this issue in two different ways. 
The second paper, “What’s for Lunch? Determinants of National School Lunch Program 
Menus,” examines menu offerings of the NSLP across schools, highlighting variability in 
menu composition (e.g., number of fruits, vegetables, and entrees served weekly) across 
income levels. If low-income school districts offer recipients a less nutritious meal than 
their higher-income counterparts, this may exacerbate rather than alleviate the trend 
toward low-income childhood obesity. Furthermore, any menu variation across school 
demographics such as race or geographic region may muddle analysis of the NSLP based 
on participation rates. I create a new dataset providing menu composition along with 
school and community demographics from 816 elementary schools across the United 
States using publically available information. Schools were chosen in three stages. First, 
to provide a sample representing a large number of students, a school from the largest 
district (in terms of attendance) in each state was randomly selected. Second, to ensure 
income variability within the sample, the sampling frame was split into deciles based on 
income and 50 schools were randomly selected from each decile. Third, to ensure within-
state income variability, a school from the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of each state was 
selected. Menus from the 2012-2013 school year were compiled by accessing each 
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school’s website. Because menus are almost always created at the district level, no more 
than one school per district is sampled. These new data were combined with school- and 
district-level data from the Common Core Data (CCD), county-level income and 
educational attainment data from the American Community Survey (ACS), and state-
level data from School Health Policies and Programs (SHPPS). While controlling for 
school district racial profile, urbanicity, enrollment, region, education level of adults, and 
relevant food policies, household income does affect the composition of a NSLP 
reimbursable school lunch. There is strong evidence that wealthier districts offer 
elementary school students more entrée and fruit choices per week. There is weaker 
evidence that wealthier districts offer elementary school students more vegetable choices 
per week. In addition, schools with a higher proportion of students eligible to receive 
free- or reduced-price lunches offer elementary school students fewer entrée choices and 
fruit choices per week. 
The third and final paper, “Does Income Effect Students’ Choice Of Entrée Within 
National School Lunch Program Menus?” addresses the possible within-district 
nutritional value variation. Using a unique dataset of daily food purchases provided by a 
suburban school district in South Carolina, I analyze factors affecting selection of the 
daily entrée, including race, gender, age, and income-eligibility. The school lunch menu 
is set as the district level; students at the district’s eleven elementary schools choose 
between three daily entrees and a variety of fruits, vegetables, milk, and bread. In order to 
be considered a qualifying lunch (in which the school is reimbursed by the government), 
a student must select a minimum of three items, one of which must be a fruit or 
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vegetable. Daily purchases of the NSLP lunch options are determined by the appeal of 
the school menu offerings as well as financial resources available to the child. If the 
student has the means and does not like the menu options, he or she may opt to bring a 
lunch from home. Nutrition information for each of the entrées served was analyzed to 
determine the total calories (kCal), protein (grams), fat (grams), sodium (milligrams), and 
carbohydrates (grams) per entrée. Results from conditional logit models conclude that 
while all students are more likely to select entrees with more fat, sodium, and protein, 
students purchasing free lunches are more likely than students purchasing paid-price 
lunches to select entrees with more fat and carbohydrates. In addition, students 
purchasing free lunch are less likely to select entrees with more protein than students 
purchasing paid-price lunches. This research contributes to a growing body of literature 
pertaining to economic studies examining the relationship between participation in the 
NSLP and childhood obesity. The remaining sections of this chapter provide a history of 
the NSLP and describe the current federal, state, and local reimbursements. 
Program History 
The practice of providing an inexpensive or free noonday meal to students attending 
school in the United States dates back to the mid 19th century: early education reformers 
understood that compulsory education would be lost on students too hungry to 
concentrate while in school. Observing the extent of poverty among school children in 
New York City at the turn of the century, Poverty author Robert Hunter wrote “If it is a 
matter of principle in democratic America that every child shall be given a certain 
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amount of instruction, let us render it possible for them to receive it…by making full and 
adequate provision for the physical needs of the children who come from the homes of 
poverty” (Hunter 1904). Nutrition reformers were also concerned with the quality and 
sanitation of meals provided at home and advocated that schools provide a well-balanced 
meal in order to educate students in good nutrition (Levine 2008). Most early lunch 
programs were funded by local charities, social organizations, religious groups, and, for 
some major cities, the school district.  
The Great Depression significantly increased the number of children needing a free meal 
and introduced the first federal subsidies for school lunch in an unexpected way. In an 
attempt to support American farmers while helping the poor, the 1935 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act created a program to purchase commodity surplus and redistribute it to 
the unemployed and needy. These commodities were distributed to schools that employed 
workers from the Works Progress Administration (WPA), and schools began providing 
inexpensive meals with regularity. By 1942, two-fifths of United States schools provided 
some form of school lunch (Poppendieck 2010).  
In 1946, the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act (NSLA) institutionalized 
federal subsidies for school meals. The goals of the NSLA were “to safeguard the health 
and well-being of the Nation’s children and to encourage the domestic consumption of 
nutritious agricultural commodities and other food, by assisting the States…in providing 
an adequate supply of foods and other facilities for the establishment, maintenance, 
operation, and expansion of nonprofit school lunch programs” (P.L. 79-396 1946). In 
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exchange for federal cash and commodity subsidies, participating schools were required 
to serve a lunch providing one-third to one-half of Recommended Daily Allowances 
(RDA) for children 10 to 12 years of age.2 This “Type A” lunch consisted of a minimum 
of 1) one-half pint whole milk, 2) two ounces of protein, 3) six ounces of vegetable or 
fruit, 4) one serving of bread, and 5) two teaspoons of butter or fortified margarine.3 
The NSLA directed schools to feed children in need, but left it up to each state to define 
“need,” providing leeway for many schools to not serve any free meals. Aid was 
allocated to states for the provision of non-profit school lunches based on the state’s total 
number of school-age children and the average per capita income-level, but did not 
specify how the money should be dispersed among each state’s schools. Additionally, 
each state was required to match federal funds from local sources, including student 
payments (Kerr 1990). In order to maintain high reimbursements per lunch served, many 
states chose to limit the number of schools participating in the NSLP. Contributions by 
state varied greatly as poorer states often depended more on student payments to match 
federal funds. For example, in 1967 Alabama did not use any state money to finance the 
NSLP; in New York, only 53 percent of matching funds came from student NSLP 
payments. Finally, the NSLA did not provide money to cover capital and labor expenses, 
                                                
2 The first Recommended Daily Allowances were published in 1943, creating a guideline for a “balanced 
meal” based on seven food groups. Home economists from the National Academy of Sciences, Institute of 
Medicine, and the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Board established the RDAs to provide a nutrition baseline 
for women, men, and children in case of food shortages due to World War II. Recommendations depended 
upon activity level, age, and gender. For teenage boys (girls), the calorie RDA ranged from 3,400 to 3,800 
(2,400 to 2,800). 
 
3 A “Type B” lunch needed to meet ¼ to 1/3 of RDAs and a “Type C” lunch was a pint of milk. These 
lunches had lower reimbursement rates and were phased out by 1980.  
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creating a barrier to participation for low-income schools. Because of the lax 
requirements governing how states allocate the NSLA subsidies and what counts as 
matching funds, in the first twenty years the NSLP acted more as a subsidy for middle-
income students than a poverty-relief program (Michelman 1976).  
Two amendments to the NSLA in 1962 expanded the program to a broader group of 
students. First, the formula for federal appropriations to states changed to account for the 
NSLP participation level, creating an incentive for states to increase total participation 
rates (P.L. 87-688 1962). Second, the amendment authorized additional funds allocated to 
schools with a high percent of low-income children.4  
The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (CNA) continued to expand the program, increasing 
total funding to the program and providing additional funds to cover capital expenses and 
administrative costs in low-income schools. By 1968, 73 percent of school-age students 
were enrolled in a participating school (Gunderson 1970). The NSLA and CNA were 
amended in 1970 to establish uniform eligibility guidelines for free and reduced price 
lunches and prohibit discrimination based on income-eligibility (Ralston, et al. 2008). 
Students from households with incomes less than 125 percent of the poverty line were 
eligible for free lunch; students from households with income between 125 and 195 
percent of the poverty line were deemed eligible for reduced price lunches, not to exceed 
$0.20 (Zucchino & Ranney 1990). Reimbursement levels were tied to the price of the 
                                                
4 Funds to support this amendment were not appropriated until the 1966 fiscal year, when Congress 
increased total funding to the NSLP (Kerr 1990). 
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lunch served, with paid-price lunch given the smallest reimbursement and free lunch the 
largest. These shifts in policy greatly increased access and participation to the NSLP.  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the rapid increase in lunches served in the early 1970s. In 1969, 3.4 
billion NSLP lunches were served to students (including both free and paid-price 
lunches). By 1975, 4 billion lunches were served, or a 20 percent increase from 1969. 
The makeup of the participants was changing as well. In 1969, 85 percent of all lunches 
served were paid-price lunches; by 1974, that number declined to 65 percent (Food and 
Nutrition Service 2013a).5 Throughout the 1970s, the number of total NSLP lunches 
served continued to increase steadily while the percent of full-price lunches served 
decreased 14 percent. By 1979, program costs had more than tripled to 2.8 billion dollars. 
The per unit federal subsidy also doubled during this time period, mainly through larger 
cash reimbursements due to an increasing proportion of free-lunch participants (Figure 
1.2). Commodity subsidies, introduced in the original NSLA as an added market for U.S. 
farmers, reached a peak in 1980; the total per unit commodity subsidy has declined since 
then. 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 1980 and 1981 significantly 
impacted both participation and costs of the NSLP. Cash reimbursements for all three 
price-tiers were reduced $0.025 per lunch and commodity subsidies decreased $0.0575 
per lunch. To offset the decrease in federal funding, the maximum price allowed for a 
reduced-price meal increased from $0.20 to $0.40. Income-eligibility guidelines also 
                                                
5 1969 is the earliest year this data is consistently available. 
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changed: students from households with income less than 130 percent of the poverty line 
were eligible for free lunch and students from households with income between 130 and 
185 percent of the poverty line were eligible for reduced price lunch. In an effort to 
reduce fraud, income-eligibility verification procedures were instituted, increasing 
administrative costs incurred by the school district. The OBRAs cancelled funding for 
facility equipment, staff training, and nutrition education. Some school districts increased 
the cost of a full-price lunch to make up for the decrease in overall reimbursements, while 
other schools dropped out of the NSLP entirely, resulting in a 7.4 percent annual 
reduction in the number of full-price NSLP participants and a 14 percent drop in the 
number of lunches served between 1980 and 1983 (Hanson & Oliveira 2012; U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1984). Lastly, states were required to match 30 percent of the 
federal cash reimbursements, less the percent that state per capita income falls below 
national per capita income.6 
In the 1990s, concern with the increasing number of overweight or obese school-age 
children moved public attention from the cost of subsidizing school meals to the 
nutritional content of each meal, particularly the high percent of fats, sodium, and 
cholesterol. The Dietary Guidelines for Americans set in 1990 suggested that all people 
over the age of two limit intake to no more than 30 percent of calories from fat and no 
more than 10 percent of calories from saturated fat. Nutrition science had evolved faster 
than the components of a “Type A” lunch, defined in a time when nutritionists believed 
                                                
6 These rates have been held at 1980/81 spending levels; in the 2010 fiscal year, state spending on food 
service comprised only 3 percent of current expenditures nationwide (Cornman, Young, & Herrell, 2012).  
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that school-age children needed diets high in fat in order to thrive (Sims 1998). In 1976, 
the component requiring all lunches include two teaspoons of either butter or margarine 
was removed and schools were allowed to offer reduced-fat and skim milk in addition to 
whole milk (Levine 2008). However, federal commodities distributed to schools still 
included large amounts of items high in fat, sodium, and cholesterol such as beef and 
cheese.  
The 1991/92 School Nutrition Dietary Assessment (SNDA-I) conducted in part by the 
USDA estimated that the average school lunch had 38 percent of calories from fat and 15 
percent of calories from saturated fats, both much higher than the current suggested levels 
(Poppendieck 2010). In response, the Healthy Meals for Healthy Americans Act was 
passed in 1994 requiring all reimbursable meals conform to the Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans by 1996. Unfortunately, results from the most recent SNDA conducted in the 
2009/10 school year (SY) show that only 35 percent of schools offered NSLP lunches 
containing at most 30 percent of calories from fat and only 14 percent of schools offered 
NSLP lunches consistent with all dietary guidelines. Following the Healthy Meals for 
Healthy Americans Act, in 1995 the School Meals Initiative for Healthy Children 
initiated “Team Nutrition,” a program requiring more nutrition education for students and 
training for school personnel (Sims 1998). 
Continued concern over program nutrition and access enabled the Child Nutrition and 
WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004. The act required schools develop a wellness plan 
specifying nutrition and physical fitness goals and reduced the income-eligibility burden 
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for both households and schools. Eligible households can remain authorized to receive 
free or reduced price lunch for one year, regardless of changes in income. Also, 
households already receiving benefits from another food assistance program (such as 
food stamps) are offered “direct certification” without filling out additional paperwork, 
reducing schools’ administrative costs. 
Most recently, the nutrition standards of reimbursable NSLP lunches have been modified 
to include more whole grains, fruits, and vegetables (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
2012). Beginning in SY 2012/13, the federal guidelines require cafeterias serve at least 
one food item from each of the following food components: 1) meat or meat alternative, 
2) bread or starch, 3) fruit, 4) vegetable, and 5) milk. In order to qualify as a reimbursable 
lunch, a student must select at least three components, one of which must be either a fruit 
or a vegetable. In addition, a lunch should provide between 550 and 660 calories, limit 
calories from saturated fat to 10 percent, and limit average sodium intake to less than 640 
milligrams per meal. In an effort to include a greater variety of vegetables, schools must 
offer at least one serving per week of dark green, starchy, and red/orange as well as one 
serving per week of legumes and other vegetables. Appendix A outlines the specific 
requirements regarding fruits and vegetables. Schools meeting these new standards 
receive a “performance-based reimbursement” of $0.06 to cover the additional cost of 
providing a more healthful meal (P.L. 111–296 2010). The next section outlines the 




Current NSLP ReimbursementsEquation Section 1 
Federal reimbursements to school districts are based on the number of lunches served at 
each price. To be reimbursed, each school food authority (SFA) records the number of 
free, reduced-price, and paid lunches served. Additional federal subsidies come in the 
form of entitlement and bonus commodities. SFAs are given a per meal allotment to 
purchase entitlement commodities at a competitive rate from USDA approved 
distributors. These commodities include meats, cheese, produce, and grains. Bonus 
commodities are donated to schools when the USDA determines foods are in surplus; 
these include dry beans, canned crushed pineapple, and frozen cherries (Ralston et al. 
2008). In 2005, entitlement and bonus commodities made up on average 17 percent of 
total food budgets (Ralston et al. 2008). Federal funds are a function of both the 
reimbursement rates and the household income level of the SFA’s student body.  
Annual federal reimbursements for the ith SFA can be calculated as 
(1.1) Fedi = !Lfree,i + "Lreduced ,i +# Lpaid ,i + Li I $( )i + I %( )i +&'( )* + Bonus   
The total number of lunches served in SFA i,  Li , is the sum of Lfree,i , Lreduced ,i ,  Lpaid ,i , the 
total number of free, reduced-price, and paid-price lunches served, respectively. 
Reimbursement rates  are the base subsidy rates for free, reduced-price, and paid-
price lunches, respectively. SFAs receive the largest reimbursement for free lunches and 
the smallest reimbursement rate for paid-price lunches, thus ϕ > ρ > ψ. In addition to the 




based on financial need and meal quality. SFAs serving more than 60 percent free or 
reduced-price lunches qualify for an additional subsidy, ! , for each lunch served, thus 
I !( )i = !  if 
Lfree,i + Lreduced ,i
Li
> 0.60;  else 0.   
After passing a certification process, SFAs meeting the updated nutritional guidelines 
also qualify to receive an additional per meal reimbursement, π.7 This subsidy was added 
in the 2012/13 school year to help schools meet the new guidelines (P.L. 111–296 2010). 
Let if the SFA is certified and otherwise. All SFAs are entitled to 
receive funds earmarked to purchase commodities. Let κ be the subsidy allotted for 
entitlement commodities. Entitlement subsidies must be spent on commodities selected 
by the USDA. Lastly, let Bonus be the in-kind donations received by SFAs from bonus 
commodities. Table 1.1 lists the subsidy rates for SY 2011/12 through 2013/14. 
In order to receive federal subsidies, each state is required to contribute a minimum of 30 
percent of a portion of the 1981 OBRA cash reimbursement level, less the percentage that 
the state’s per capita income falls below the national per capita income (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 2012). The OBRA levels are set at $0.30, $0.15, and $0.0275 for each free, 
reduced-price, and paid-price lunches. Each state may elect to provide additional funds. 
Let IncomeState,i be the per capita income of the ith SFA’s state and IncomeUS be the per 
capita income in the United States. Annual state revenue for the ith SFA can be calculated 
as  
                                                
7 To qualify to receive this performance-based subsidy, an SFA must submit a sample weekly menu to the 
state, where it is examined to make sure it meets or exceeds the nutritional guidelines (See Table 1.1)  
I !( )i = ! I !( )i = 0
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(1.2)   Statei ! " 0.30Lfree,i + 0.15Lreduced ,i + 0.0275Lpaid ,i( )   
where  
.  
Districts also generate local revenues through local taxes and payments from students. 
Together, state and local revenues make up only nine percent of total NSLP funding 
(Cornman, Young, & Herrell 2012). Local taxes and student lunch purchases make up the 
two main revenue streams. Annual local revenue for the ith SFA can be calculated as 
(1.3)   Locali =! iLreduced ,i + µiLpaid ,i +" iTi +Yi  . 
The first two terms represent revenues from student purchases. Local revenue may also 
be collected by the SFA’s city or town through a tax, Ti (e.g. property tax). The 
proportion of taxes given to the education budget and specifically to the production of 
school meals, τi, depends on local preferences and political environment. Lastly, Yi 
represents the local revenue collected by local charities or social organizations (e.g. 
Parent Teacher Association). 
Recall that each school district may set the cost to the student for reduced-price and paid-
price lunches, with conditions. Let ωi be the cost to the student of a reduced-price lunch, 
where ωi ≤ $0.40. Let µi be the cost to student of a paid-price lunch. In the 2011/12 
school year, the average paid-price lunch cost $1.78 and the base subsidy rate was $0.26. 
The average SFA received at least $2.04 per paid-price lunch and $2.77 per free lunch, 
! =
0.30 if IncomeState,i " IncomeUS







suggesting that the federal free and reduced-price reimbursements are also subsidizing 
the cost of paid-price lunches (Food and Nutrition Service 2013c). This may also suggest 
that students purchasing paid-price lunches are sensitive to price increase and SFAs 
trying to maintain high participation rates are reluctant to increase prices.   
Federal involvement in the National School Lunch Program began as a mechanism to 
eliminate surplus agricultural commodities while providing for needy children. Since 
1946, the program has expanded in both access and scope, serving over 5 billion lunches 
to 92 percent of all school-age students annually (Currie 2003). Federal funding per meal 
has increased overtime, partly due to the increase in the percent of free and reduced lunch 
participants. Public opinion is mixed on whether the meal delivers the most healthy and 




Table 1.1. NSLP Subsidy Rates  
  Rate ($) 
  2011/12  2012/13  2013/14 
Free (! )  2.77  2.86  2.93 
Reduced-Price ( ! )  2.37  2.46  2.53 
Paid-Price (! )  0.26  0.27  0.28 
High-need (! )  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Performance (! )  --  0.06  0.06 
Entitlement (! )  0.2225  0.2225  0.2225 
Notes: School food authorities (SFA) serving more than 60 percent of free- or reduced-price lunches are 
eligible to receive “high-need” subsidy. Performance subsidies are given to SFAs that meet or exceed the 
nutritional guidelines set in January, 2012 and have been state certified for doing that. Entitlement subsidies 
must be spent on commodities selected by the USDA. Due to the higher cost of living, reimbursement rates 






Figure 1.1.  NSLP Participation, 1969 - 2012 
 
 




ARE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PARTICIPANTS MORE 
LIKELY TO BE OBESE?  SELECTION AND IDENTIFICATION ISSUES 
Introduction  
In the past decade, the nutritional content National School Lunch Program (NSLP) has 
become a target of consumer advocates and politicians concerned about the increasing 
rates of childhood obesity. Although the source of the obesity epidemic is debated in the 
literature with some authors pointing to a sedentary lifestyle (Blair & Brodney 1999) and 
genetics (Comuzzi & Allison 1998) as causes, most researchers cite increased 
consumption as the main culprit (Chandon & Wansink 2007a and 2007b; Hill & Peters 
1998). Since the NSLP is offered at more than eighty percent of all primary and 
secondary schools and provides lunches to over 31 million students annually, the 
nutritional quality of the meals—good or bad—may have a significant impact on 
childhood health (Ogden & Carroll 2010; Currie 2003).  
Current economic research on the relationship between participation in the NSLP and 
obesity is equivocal. While some studies conclude that participation contributes to 
obesity (Schanzenbach 2009; Millimet, Tchernis, & Husain 2010), a more recent study 
focusing on only low-income students suggests the opposite (Gunderson, Kreider, & 
Pepper 2012). This paper adds to the literature by estimating the effect of participation on 
obesity using approaches from three previous studies: recursive bivariate probit from 
Millimet, Tchernis, & Husain (2010), regression discontinuity from Schanzenbach 
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(2009), and nonparametric treatment effects from Gunderson Kreider and Pepper (2012). 
While each of these studies uses different datasets, we conduct the analysis using the 
same sample from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), 
thus allowing better comparisons across econometric models.  
The majority of economic, nutrition, and medical research use body mass index (BMI) to 
measure whether or not an individual is obese because it is an easy to calculate and 
unobtrusive estimate using the ratio of weight to the square of height. However, it is 
known in the medical community that BMI is not always the best measure of an 
individual’s adiposity (fat content) nor is it the best indicator of health risks associated 
with obesity, such as cardiovascular disease, high blood pressure, and Type-2 diabetes 
(Parks, Smith, Alston 2010; Prentice & Jebb 2001; Smalley et al 1990). We add to the 
economic literature two new measures of obesity: percent body fat and waist to height 
ratio.  
We find estimation of the effect depends on the model: OLS regression and recursive 
bivariate probit model estimates find a positive effect of participation in the school lunch 
program on the likelihood of being obese. Contrarily, regression discontinuity design and 
nonparametric bounds estimation procedures identify a negative, but insignificant, effect 
of participation on the likelihood of being obese. The positive effect of the NSLP on 





Identification issues are inherent in many economic problems, and estimating the 
relationship of the NSLP on childhood obesity is no exception. To begin, selection into 
the NSLP is not random; many of the same populations at higher risk for obesity are 
more likely to choose to participate in the NSLP (Currie 2003; Ogden & Carroll 2010). 
Furthermore, participants are not a homogenous group. Unlike most government 
programs providing food for low-income children, any child can participate in the NSLP 
regardless of income. The NSLP provides free and reduced-cost lunches for income-
eligible students as well as minimally subsidizing paid lunches for students that are 
income-ineligible. Students with a household income of 130 percent of the poverty line or 
less are eligible for the free lunch. Students with household incomes between 130 percent 
and 185 percent of the poverty line are eligible for the reduced-price lunch. Students with 
household incomes over 185 percent are income-ineligible but may purchase a “full-
price” lunch.8  
While all previous studies have controlled for income when assessing the impact of 
participation on childhood obesity, most have not distinguished between participants 
receiving free or reduced price lunches (referred to as income-eligible students) and 
participants receiving a full price lunch (income-ineligible students). Two exceptions 
include Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper (2012), who analyze the impact for income-
                                                




eligible students and Schanzenbach (2009), who analyzes the effect of participation for 
income-ineligible students.  
There has been a significant amount of research about the NSLP within the economics 
literature as well as the nutrition science literature. Until recently, results have been 
descriptive in nature and have not considered the effects of non-random selection into the 
program. Current analyses of the relationship between the NSLP and nutritional 
outcomes (including the rate of obesity) use a variety of methods to control for selection 
on unobservables, including fixed effects (Gleason & Suitor 2003), two-step Heckman 
procedures (Long 1991), regression discontinuity (Schanzenbach 2009), and propensity 
score matching (Campbell et al. 2011). Instrumental variables have, for the most part, 
been rejected due to minimal predictive power (Bhattacharya, Currie, & Haider 2004). 
Using data from (NHANES) 1999 to 2006, Campbell et al. (2011) estimate the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATET) using propensity score matching. Instead of 
looking at the effect of participation on weight, the authors look at specific nutritional 
intakes such as fat, sodium, and vitamins and find that students participating in the NSLP 
five days a week report consuming more Vitamin A, calcium, protein, and fat at lunch 
than non-participants. These results support previous research by Gleason & Suitor 
(2003) using OLS fixed effects model. Campbell et al. (2011) also determine that these 
increases in nutrients come from consuming a higher-quantity diet (not a higher-quality 
diet) than non-participants at lunch. The differences between participants and non-
participants’ food consumption at breakfast and dinner are insignificant, suggesting that 
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participation in the NSLP may increase the probability of being obese through consuming 
larger quantities of food at lunch.  
Schanzenbach (2009) uses panel data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study—
Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS-K) to assess the causal effect of the NSLP on obesity. The 
author separates individuals into risk categories depending on their weight upon entering 
kindergarten and observes that income-ineligible NSLP participants are 1 to 2 percentage 
points more likely to be obese by end of first grade. Additionally, taking advantage of the 
sharp income-eligibility cutoff of 185 percent, Schanzenbach uses regression-
discontinuity design (RD) to observe that income-eligible students are more likely to be 
obese than income-ineligible students. Due to the limitations of RD, this result only holds 
for students with household income around 185 percent. Using the same dataset, 
Millimet, Tchernis, and Husain (2010) assess the impact of both the NSLP and the 
School Breakfast Program (SBP). They find similar results to Schanzenbach, even though 
their sample includes income-eligible and ineligible students. Millimet, Tchernis, and 
Husain then use a bivariate probit model to estimate the impact of positive selection into 
the SBP. When controlling for positive selection, the authors find that the school lunch 
program contributes to obesity rates while the breakfast program does not.  
Another way to account for endogeneity in treatment not captured by covariates is by 
computing bounds on average treatment effect. Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper (2012) 
calculate bounds on average treatment effect of the NSLP on three negative health 
outcomes: self-reported poor health, household food insecurity, and obesity. The data are 
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collected from NHANES 2002 to 2004 and the sample is limited to income-eligible 
students. The authors use a monotone instrumental variable assumption that each 
outcome is non-increasing with income such that non-participants have weakly lower 
outcomes. Using this nonparametric method, the authors find that under weak 
assumptions, the NSLP reduces the rate of poor health, food insecurity, and obesity 
(measured by BMI). Specifically, participation in the NSLP by income-eligible students 
reduces the rate of obesity by 17 percent (3.2 percentage points), contradicting 
Schanzenbach and Millimet, Tchernis, and Husain’s results. 
This brief review of the previous literature illustrates the complexity in determining a 
causal effect of the NSLP on childhood obesity. It appears that the school lunches 
provide a larger lunch with more nutrients than lunches from home (Gleason & Suitor 
2003; Campbell et al. 2011). For low-income students coming from households unable to 
provide breakfast or dinner, participating in the NSLP may reduce malnutrition and be 
beneficial to overall health. For other students, the NSLP may contribute to obesity but 
only by a small amount. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next 
section describes the data and provides summary statistics of variables used in the 
analyses. We then present four approaches to estimating the effect of the NSLP on 
childhood obesity. Methods and results are reported for 1) ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS), 2) recursive bivariate probit model, 3) nonparametric bounds 





Data are obtained from NHANES. NHANES includes interviews and medical 
examinations of a nationally representative sample of about 5,000 U.S. citizens annually; 
about half are children. Clusters of households within predetermined counties are selected 
and one or more persons from each household are chosen to participate in the survey. 
Sampling weights are used to find accurate estimates and standard errors. To increase the 
sample size and account for any unobserved changes over time, we use a pooled cross-
sectional sample of children who attended elementary, middle, and high school between 
2001 and 2008 and include survey year as a dummy variable. 
All data used in the analysis come from the household interviews, with the exception of 
body measurements obtained in the medical examinations. These measurements are used 
to calculate three measurements of obesity used as outcomes in the analyses: body mass 
index (BMI), percent body fat, and waist to height ratio. The head of household, defined 
as a household member 18 years or older that rents or owns the residence, provides all 
information pertaining to the household and may assist minors in their individual 
interview (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009). Like all self-reported data, 
NHANES may have reliability issues. For example, the respondent may be unfamiliar 
with the specific household management, such as household income. Furthermore, under-
reporting of participation in government programs such as the NSLP may occur, biasing 





We use three indicators of obesity as outcome variables: BMI, percent body fat, and waist 
to height ratio. First, the indicator variable BMIi measures whether the ith student is obese 
(BMIi =1) or not (BMIi =0). A child is defined as obese if his or her BMI is greater than 
the age and gender-specific threshold, BMIi,95%. This threshold is calculated by the Center 
for Disease Control (CDC) as greater than the 95th percentile for weight based on growth 
charts. Second, the indicator variable Body Fati measures whether the ith child has high 
percent body fat (Body Fati=1) or not (Body Fati=0). A child is considered to have high 
fat content if the total body fat is greater than 30 percent (Reilly, Wilson, & Durnin 
1995). Body fat measurements require specialized equipment to measure and therefore 
are less often used than BMI. However, this more refined measurement does distinguish 
between muscle and fat. Third, the indicator variable WtH Ratioi measures whether child 
i has a waist to height ratio greater than 0.5 (WtH Ratioi=1) or not (WtH Ratioi=0). An 
individual with a waist to height ratio greater than 0.5 is considered obese (Browning, 
Hseih, & Ashwell 2010). This measure of central adiposity is easy to calculate and may 
be a more sensitive predictor of cardiovascular disease and diabetes than BMI (Gelber et 
al. 2008; Browning, Hseih, & Ashwell 2010). 
Control Variables 
A child’s body composition depends on age, gender, race, calories consumed and calories 
burned, and genetics. For example, females are more likely to store energy as fat instead 
of muscle and children with obese parents may be genetically predisposed to obesity. 
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NHANES includes myriad health, socio-economic, and nutritional outcomes, but 
information on parental height, weight, or health is unfortunately not provided and thus 
the genetic component of body composition remains unobserved. Instead, birth weight is 
included to control for genetic and biological factors. An appropriate measure of calories 
burned (exercise) is not available across all years, so two measures of inactivity are 
included in the analysis: average daily hours watching television and using the computer. 
We expect that the more time spent at either activity, the fewer hours spent engaged in 
physical activity and thus the more likely a child is obese. Two-day dietary recall 
information is provided for only a very limited number of individuals, so a measure of 
calorie input is not included in the analyses.  
To control for characteristics across households, education, income, and marital status of 
the head of household are included as covariates. Household education is measured by 
the education attainment of the female head of household. Female education level is used 
instead of male because we assume that in most households the female adult makes most 
decisions about food, including whether the child brings a lunch from home instead of 
eating a school lunch. Household income is measured as the income to poverty ratio 
(PIR); a PIR of 2 means a household’s income is 200% of the poverty line. Measuring 
income relative to poverty is helpful in some of the analyses because it identifies income 
eligible students (PIR < 1.85). Additionally, because the poverty line changes annually, 
PIR does not need to be adjusted by the consumer price index (CPI). Table 2.1 provides 




The sample includes 6,410 students in elementary, middle, or high school who 
participated in the NHANES interview and medical examination. Only students attending 
schools that serve school lunch are included. Descriptive statistics of key variables can be 
found in Table 2.2. The average age within the sample is 10.6 years old and 47 percent of 
the sample attends elementary school. The average PIR for all students is 252 percent of 
the poverty level. For a family of four in 2008, this is equivalent to approximately 
$53,000. 14.8 percent of all students sampled are obese, as measured by BMI, 16.8 
percent have high percent body fat, and 29.2 percent of all students sampled have large 
waist to height ratios. This result suggests that Body Fat is more closely correlated with 
BMI than WtH Ratio; in fact, 17.2 percent of students identified as not obese have large 
waist to height ratio while only 7.6 percent of students classified as not obese have high 
body fat. Forty percent of all students participate in the school lunch program five days 
per week.  
Similarly to previous research, we find significant differences with NSLP participants 
and non-participants as well as between obese and non-obese children (Dunifon and 
Kowaleski-Jones 2001; Ogden & Carroll 2010). Both obese students and NSLP 
participants are more likely to come from lower-income households: on average non-
participants have a household income of 313 percent of the poverty line compared to 216 
percent for NSLP participants. The difference between household income among obese 
and non-obese students is smaller but still significant. On average, obese students in the 
sample are 0.23 pounds heavier at birth than non-obese students, suggesting the 
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possibility of an unobserved genetic component of obesity. The majority of students 
sampled are non-Hispanic white. Although Mexican Americans make up only 12.30 
percent of the sample, 53.9 percent of all NSLP participants are Mexican American, 18.7 
percent are white, and 14.9 percent are black. 
The summary statistics for household education seem unusual. Twenty-three percent of 
the students sampled come from households where the female head of household is a 
college graduate. Interestingly, 25.7 percent of NSLP participants sampled come from 
households where the female is a college graduate while only 10.9 percent of non-
participants come from households where the female is a college graduate. It may be 
possible that as the female’s level of education increases, her time is more valuable and 
she chooses not to prepare a lunch for the child. 
Measuring the Effect of Participation 
This section presents four approaches to estimating the effect of National School Lunch 
Program participation on childhood obesity measured through BMI, percent body fat, and 
waist to height ratio. We begin with OLS regression. Second, results of the recursive 
bivariate probit model similar to Millimet, Tchernis, and Husain (2010) are presented. 
The third approach recreates the nonparametric bounds approach used by Gunderson, 
Kreider, and Pepper (2012) but includes two new outcomes. Lastly, the fourth approach 
borrows from Schanzenbach (2009) by using RD design to estimate the local average 
treatment effect of participation. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the interpretation of 
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the treatment effect and do not discuss the effects of the other covariates. However, all 
results are presented in Tables 2.3 through 2.7. 
Approach One: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Equation Section 2 
The first approach in determining the effect of participating in the NSLP on childhood 
obesity is the OLS regression. It is well known that a linear regression model will not 
provide consistent estimates when modeling binary outcomes because it ignores the 
discreteness of the variable; this approach serves primarily as a baseline comparison for 
the subsequent methods. The regression models are defined as: 
(2.1)  BMIi =! BMI + "xi#BMI + "hi$ BMI + "gi% BMI + NSLPi& BMI + ' i,BMI   
(2.2)  Body Fati =! BF + "xi#BF + "hi$ BF + "gi% BF + NSLPi& BF + ' i,BF   
(2.3)  WtH  Ratioi =!WtH + "xi#WtH + "hi$WtH + "gi% WtH + NSLPi&WtH + ' i,WtH  . 
Let be a vector of individual covariates including age, gender, and race. Let be a 
vector of health indicators that contribute to increased measures of obesity (birth weight, 
daily television use, and daily computer use) and  be a vector of household 
demographics including education, income, marital status, and survey year. The indicator 
variable NSLPi measures whether student i participates in the school lunch program 
(NSLPi =1) or not (NSLPi =0). Let BMIi, Body Fati, and WtH Ratioi be the discrete 





Results of the OLS regression are similar across all three models (Table 2.3). The overall 
fit of the models is very low with R2 between 3.5 percent and 6.7 percent. The estimates 
in Table 2.3 are not weighted to account for survey design, however we find no 
significant difference between weighted and non-weighted results. We find statistically 
insignificant and small coefficients on NSLP ranging from 0.008 to -0.007. This suggests 
that participating in the NSLP increases your probability of being obese (measured by 
BMI) by less than 1 percentage point. Contrarily, participating in the NSLP decreases 
your probability of having high percentage of body fat by 0.7 percentage points. These 
estimates are similar in magnitude to results in Schanzenbach (2009). Similar results are 
found when health and household characteristics are not controlled (i.e., when  and  
are not included in equations 2.1 - 2.3).   
This model assumes that participation in the NSLP is exogenous. However, it is likely 
that many of the observable covariates and unobservable characteristics impacting the 
decision to participate may also impact the probability of being obese. The next approach 
tries to account for potential endogeneity of NSLP due to nonrandom selection.  
Approach Two: Recursive Bivariate Probit Model  
The recursive bivariate probit model allows for the endogeneity of NSLP participation 
but requires strong distributional assumptions of the error term. Millimet, Tchernis, and 
Husain (2010) use this model “to assess the impact of positive selection” into the School 
Breakfast Program and note that while the model is identified without exclusion 




valid instrument. We use the same outcome variables and covariates as described in the 
first approach: 
(2.4)    
1)  BMIi*= !xi"BMI + !hi# BMI + !gi$ BMI +% BMINSLPi + & i1,BMI ,   
                       BMIi = 1 if BMIi*> BMIi, 95%,  else 0
2)  NSLPi*= !xi'BMI + !gi$ BMI + & i2,BMI ,   NSLPi = 1 if NSLPi*> 0,   else 0
  
(2.5)    
1)  Body Fati*= !xi"BF + !hi# BF + !gi$ BF +% BFNSLPi + & i1,BF ,   
                               Body Fati = 1 if Body Fatii*> .30,  else 0
2)  NSLPi*= !xi'BF + !gi$ BF + & i2,BF ,   NSLPi = 1 if NSLPi*> 0,   else 0
  
(2.6)    
1)  WtH  Ratioi*= !xi"WtH + !hi#WtH + !gi$ WtH +%WtHNSLPi + & i1,WtH ,   
                                WtH  Ratioi = 1 if WtH  Ratioi*> 0.5,  else 0
2)  NSLPi*= !xi'WtH + !gi$ WtH + & i2,WtH ,   NSLPi = 1 if NSLPi*> 0,   else 0
  
In Equations 2.4 – 2.6., NSLPi is simultaneously determined because it is endogenous to 
the three outcomes, BMIi, Body Fati, and WtH Ratioi. The first equation in each model 
includes vectors of individual, health, and household explanatory variables defined in the 
previous section as ,  and , respectively. These variables are selected to control 
for possible household and environmental factors. The second equation in each model 
does not include covariates controlling for health. 
To find consistent estimators of the model, the log likelihood function for each bivariate 
probit model is maximized: 
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The log-likelihood function, LLF, is the summation of the four possible combinations of 
Y1 and NSLP. Let Y1 be the chosen measure of obesity (either BMI, Body Fat, or WtH 
Ratio). The standard normal bivariate distribution, , requires both error terms !!,!! 
and !!,!! have a mean of zero and variance of one. The covariance (or disturbance term) 
between !!,!! and !!,!! is !!!. If the !!! = 0, NSLPi is exogenous to the chosen measure 
of obesity. If !!! ≠ 0, the error terms !!,!! and !!,!! are positively or negatively 
correlated, depending on the sign of !!!. This may indicate selection bias on 
unobservables as well (Altonji, Elder, Taber 2005; Millimet, Tchernis, and Husain, 
2010). It is important to note that a non-zero disturbance term may be due to true 
correlation between childhood obesity and NSLP participation as well as specification 
error within the model. 
Table 2.4 provides the estimated coefficients for the recursive bivariate probit model. 
Again, results across the three models are similar. The coefficient !!! ranges from is 
0.705 to 0.805 and is statistically significant in the BMI and WtH Ratio models, 
suggesting that participation in the school lunch program increases the likelihood of 
being obese when measured as an individual’s BMI or waist to height ratio. Participation 
in the NSLP is not significant when Body Fat is the outcome. The disturbance term is 
 !2 i( )
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estimated to be negative and statistically different than zero. This is a surprising and a 
somewhat counterintuitive result: after accounting for individual and household 
characteristics and the effect of NSLP participation on obesity rates, there is a significant 
negative correlation between unobservables in the two equations, indicating that obese 
students are less likely to participate in the school lunch program. Recall that this term is 
due to either true correlation or specification error in the model. If the model is specified 
appropriately, this result indicates negative selection into the school lunch program. 
The marginal effects of NSLP participation on the three health outcomes are also 
included in Table 2.4. All three marginal effects are positive and statistically significant. 
The probability of being obese (Y1=BMI) is 11.7 percentage points higher for students 
participating in the school lunch program. The probability of having a high percentage of 
body fat increases 9.0 percentage points for participants and the probability of having a 
large waist to height ratio increases 18.3 percentage points for students participating in 
the NSLP. This estimate is significant and supports studies finding increased fat intake of 
NSLP participants (e.g. Gleason & Suitor 2003; Campbell et al. 2011) and those finding 
positive relationships between participation and obesity (e.g. Millimet, Tchernis, and 
Husain 2010; Schanzenbach 2009). However, without a valid instrument, a causal effect 
of participation in the NSLP on childhood obesity cannot be determined with the 
bivariate probit model. The next approach uses nonparametric methods to partially 




Approach Three: Nonparametric Bounds  
The previous models have dealt with endogenous treatment selection by imposing strict 
parametric assumptions (recursive bivariate probit model) or ignoring them completely 
(OLS regression). In contrast, the third approach uses nonparametric bounds to partially 
identify the average treatment effect (ATE). We observe , a set of covariates 
within  defining each subpopulation. Let  be a student’s potential health 
outcome if participating in NSLP and let  be a student’s potential health outcome if not 
participating in NSLP. For this analysis, includes BMI, Body Fat, and WtH Ratio. The 
average treatment effect is 
(2.8)   ATE = E y1 x!" #$ % E y0 x!" #$   
where   
 
E y1 x!" #$ = pE y1 x,  NSLP = 1!" #$ + 1% p( )E y1 x,  NSLP = 0!" #$
E y0 x!" #$ = pE y0 x,  NSLP = 1!" #$ + 1% p( )E y0 x,  NSLP = 0!" #$
p = Pr NSLP = 1 x( )
E yt[ ]& 0,1[ ]
  
For each student, we observe either y1or y0 , a binary outcome, but we do not observe the 
counterfactual where E yt x,  NSLP ! t"# $% . We know, however, that the expectation must 
lie between 0 and 1. Unless participation in the NSLP is randomly assigned, a point 
estimate of ATE will be biased due to potential selection on unobservables. Without 
including any further assumptions, Manski (1990) developed “worst-case” bounds by 
x = w, z( )





replacing the unobserved expectations with the bounded values of yt . For each value of 
, let ATEWC be defined as: 
(2.9)     
ATEWC ! pE y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $% & p & 1& p( )E y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $%,"#
           pE y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $% + 1& p( )& 1& p( )E y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $%$%
 . 
The worst-case bounds are not very informative. By definition, they must cover zero and 
have a width of one in the case of binary outcomes. The ATEWC for yt =BMI, yt =Body 
Fat, and yt =WtH Ratio are shown in Table 2.5. The sample is divided into 20 groups 
defined by the PIR and an appropriately weighted ATEWC calculated for each group.9 
Covariates in  limit the sample to students between the age of 6 and 17 attending school 
that offers NSLP; unlike Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper, we include income-eligible 
and ineligible students. In finite samples, bounds other than ATEWC are biased. However, 
with more than 400 observations in each group, the bias should be negligible (Kreider et 
al. 2011). At worst, participation in the NSLP increases the obesity rate by 42.6 
percentage points. At best, participation decreases the obesity rate by 57.4 percentage 
points. Similar results are found for Body Fat (-0.595, 0.405) and WtH Ratio (-0.539, 
0.461).    
Inclusion of additional assumptions allows these bounds to be tightened to produce a 
more informative result without depending on strong distributional assumptions (Manski 
1990; Manski & Pepper 2000). A common assumption (and an underlying assumption for 
                                                
9 Because some are empty sets, the sample must be divided into groups. Estimates are similar when 






valid instrumental variables) is mean-independence: the mean outcome for each treatment 
is equal across all subpopulations. If covariate z is an instrumental variable, then the 




pE y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $%( )& infz p + 1& p( )E y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $%( ),
"
#'
          inf
z
pE y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $% + 1& p( )( )& sup
z
1& p( )E y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $%( )$%(
  
ATEIV are included in Table 2.5 using household PIR as an instrument for participation in 
NSLP. The ATEIV on Body Fat states that assuming students from households with 
varying income have the same mean health outcome, participation in the NSLP will at 
worse increase the probability of having high percent body fat by 10.7 percentage points 
and at best decrease the probability of having high percent body fat by 31.0 percentage 
points.  
However, it is much more likely that PIR is a monotone instrumental variable (MIV). 
That is, we expect that the probability of negative health outcomes (Body Fat, BMI, and 
WtH Ratio) weakly decrease with PIR, as in Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper (2012). 
Formally, the negative MIV assumption states that for each treatment t, 
, where z is an ordered set and. . The average 
treatment effect using the MIV assumption produces bounds that are smaller than worst-
case bounds but larger than IV bounds. Let ATEMIV be 
x







pE y1 x, z = z1,NSLP = 1#$ %&( )' infz2(z p + 1' p( )E y0 x, z = z2,NSLP = 0#$ %&( ),
#
$)
          inf
z2(z
pE y1 x, z = z2,NSLP = 1#$ %& + 1' p( )( )' sup
z1"z
1' p( )E y0 x, z = z1,NSLP = 0#$ %&( )%&*
 . 
ATEMIV bounds are also uninformative. The ATEMIV on WtH Ratio states that assuming 
students from households with lower income have weakly higher negative health 
outcomes, participation in the NSLP will at worse increase the probability of having a 
large waist to height ratio by 22.8 percentage points and at best decrease the probability 
of having a large waist to height ratio by 51.7 percentage points. While the MIV 
assumption may seem “innocuous” (Gunderson, Kreider, & Pepper 2012), our sample 
data suggest that even this assumption is incorrect. Figure 2.1 graphs each expected 
outcome by PIR. The relationship does not appear monotone (negative or positive) across 
any values of PIR. Even if analysis is restricted to income-eligible students, the expected 
values of BMI, Body Fat, and WtH Ratio appear to fluctuate between PIR values of 0 and 
1.85.  
A more common assumption in the literature is selection on unobservables. Models that 
assume exogenous selection (e.g., OLS regression) will calculate biased treatment effect 
estimates if positive or negative selection exists. Although the bivariate probit model 
estimated above found possible negative selection through the covariance term , it is 
generally assumed that unobserved characteristics associated with obesity are positively 
related to participation in the NSLP (Currie 2003). We now formalize the assumption of 




2000) within the ATE framework. In terms of this analysis, the MTS assumption states 
that a student participating in the NSLP is likely to have no better negative health 
outcome on average than non-participants. Thus the bounds of the expected outcomes are 
now:  
0 ! E y1 x,NSLP = 0"# $% ! E y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $% !1
1& E y0 x,NSLP = 1"# $% & E y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $% & 0
 . 
The MTS assumption does not change the lower bound of ATEWC but does decrease the 
upper bound. This result is intuitive: if positive selection exists, we expect estimates 
assuming exogenous selection to be biased upward. Thus the ATEMTS has the same lower 
bound of equation 2.9 and the bounds are now 
(2.12)     
ATEMTS ! pE y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $% + 1& p( )E y1 x,NSLP = 1"# $%
                   & pE y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $% & 1& p( )E y0 x,NSLP = 0"# $% .
  
The estimates of ATEMTS for each outcome are listed in Table 2.5. Including the MTS 
assumption tightens the lower bounds for all outcomes and finds negative upper bounds 
for Body Fat and WtH Ratio. Assuming positive selection, at worst participating in the 
NSLP 1) increases the probability of being obese by less than 1 percentage point, 2) 
decreases the probability of having high percent body fat by 3.7 percentage points, and 3) 
decreases the probability of having a large waist to height ratio by 1.6 percentage points. 
Unlike the MIV assumption, the authors know of no test or figure used to evaluate the 
validity of the MTS assumption. However, the assumption of positive MTS seems much 
more likely than exogenous treatment selection or negative MTS.  
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Lastly, although we question the validity of the MIV assumption, we present the 
combined MIV and MTS assumption because it may be applicable in other research 
scenarios. Let ATEMIV+MTS be  
(2.13) ATEMIV+MTS ! sup
z1"z





UB1 z2( )( )# sup
z1"z




LB1 z1( ) = pE y1 x, z = z1,NSLP = 1!" #$
UB1 z2( ) = pE y1 x,NSLP = 1!" #$ + 1% p( )E y1 x,NSLP = 1!" #$
LB0 z1( ) = pE y0 x,NSLP = 0!" #$ % 1% p( )E y0 x,NSLP = 0!" #$
UB0 z2( ) = p + 1% p( )E y0 x, z = z2,NSLP = 0!" #$
 . 
 
Again, the positive MTS assumption only changes the upper bounds of each ATEMIV+MTS. 
The lower bounds are identical to the ATEMIV lower bounds. Assuming students from 
households with lower income have weakly higher negative health outcomes in addition 
to assuming positive selection on unobservables, at worst participating in the NSLP 1) 
decreases the probability of being obese by 5.4 percentage points, 2) decreases the 
probability of having high percent body fat by 14.7 percentage points, and 3) decreases 
the probability of having a large waist to height ratio by 9.8 percentage points. When 
including income-eligible and ineligible students, the average treatment effect for BMI is 
2.2 percentage points higher than estimated by Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper (2012). 
These estimates are not comparable: recall that the Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper 
sample was limited to income-eligible students. 
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The nonparametric bounds approach suggests that under weak assumptions, the average 
treatment effect of participation in the NSLP on indicators of high percent body fat, 
obesity, and large waist to height ratio is at worst negative. This result contradicts the 
results from the first two approaches in this paper (OLS and recursive bivariate probit 
models) as well as results in the previous literature (including Millimet, Tchernis, and 
Husain (2010) and Schanzenbach (2009)). The final approach to treatment evaluation is 
regression discontinuity design.   
Approach Four: Regression Discontinuity 
Regression discontinuity takes advantage of the large disparity between the price of a 
school lunch for income-eligible students and income-ineligible students that increases 
the probability of participation for income-eligible students. By law, the reduced price 
lunch can cost the student no more than $0.40 while a “full price” meal on average costs 
$1.7810 (Food and Nutrition Service 2013c). Because income-eligible students are not 
required to participate and income-ineligible students may choose to participate and pay 
full price, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (FRD) such that 
lim
PIR!PIR0
Pr NSLPi = 1 PIRi = PIR
0( ) " lim
PIR#PIR0
Pr NSLPi = 1 PIRi = PIR
0( )   
                                                
10 The cost of a “full price” meal is set locally and thus varies from school to school. As of 2012, each “full 
price” lunch served is federally subsidized $0.26, much lower rate than the subsidy rate for free and 
reduced price lunches. State and local governments can choose to subsidize full price meals even more. For 
example, “full price” meals in New York City are currently set at $1.50.  
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where PIR0=1.85 is the threshold. In our sample, the probability of participating in NSLP 
decreases from 59 percent to 73.3 percent around the threshold, PIR0. Let the relationship 
between the three outcomes and participation in the NSLP be 
(2.14)  BMIi =! BMI + "BMINSLPi + f PIRi( ) +#i,BMI   
(2.15)  Body Fati =! BF + "BFNSLPi + f PIRi( ) +#i,BF   
(2.16)  WtH  Ratioi =!WtH + "WtHNSLPi + f PIRi( ) +#i,WtH   
where NSLPi and PIRi are defined as before, !yi is the local average causal effect (LATE) 
of participation, and !i,yi  is a vector of covariates influencing the outcome variable (age, 
gender, race, and birth weight). The estimand of !yi is the ratio of the magnitude of the 
discontinuity in the probability of each outcome to the magnitude of the discontinuity in 
the probability of participating in the school lunch program11 (Imbens & Lemieux 2007): 
(2.17)    !yi =
lim
PIR"PIR0
E yi PIRi = PIR




E NSLPi PIRi = PIR
0#$ %& ' limPIR(PIR0 E NSLPi PIRi = PIR
0#$ %&
  
where yi is student i’s obesity outcome (BMI, Body Fat, or WtH Ratio). The LATE 
estimand λ is determined by using local linear regressions to estimate the outcome 
variable on either side of the threshold PIR=1.85 (the numerator of !yi ) and then using 
local linear regression again to estimate the treatment effect on either side of the 
threshold (the denominator of !yi ).  
                                                
11 The sharp regression discontinuity design is a special case of FRD where the discontinuity in regression 
of the treatment indicator is 1.  
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Results are presented in Table 2.6 and Figures 2.2 through 2.4. Optimal bandwidth is 
defined by the IK bandwidth (Imbens & Kalyanaraman 2009). Standard errors are 
estimated using the delta method. Figure 2.2 graphs the smoothed probability of being 
obese over all values of PIR. The vertical line represents the threshold value of PIR=1.85, 
with income-eligible students to the left of the cutoff and income-ineligible students to 
the right of the cutoff. A discontinuity is present at the cutoff, but it appears small. The 
results are not consistent with Schanzenbach’s results using ECLS-K data. We find that 
students just above the threshold are more likely to be obese: participation in the school 
lunch program decreases the probability of being obese by 78 percentage points.  
Although the result is statistically insignificant and the magnitude highly improbable, the 
negative sign is congruent with the nonparametric ATE bounds estimated above. Figures 
2.3 and 2.4 show similar results for indicators of high body fat and large waist to height 
ratio. Participation in the NSLP reduces the probability of high percent body fat by 132 
percentage points and reduces the probability of large waist to height ratio by 198 
percentage points. Again, these estimates seem very unrealistic and are not significantly 
different than zero. 
The authors calculate standard robustness checks on the validity of the FRD design. To 
make sure the discontinuity is not present at other thresholds, ! yi  is estimated at PIR
0=2 
(included in Table 2.6), PIR0=2.5, and PIR0=1. The coefficients at each false threshold 
are not significant. Another specification test is calculated by running regressions on 
baseline covariates Birth Weight and Black, non-Hispanic that should not affect 
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participation in the NSLP and thus we expect continuity in each of these covariates at the 
threshold. As expected, neither of these coefficients is significant. The coefficient 
estimates do not depend on bandwidth: decreasing the bandwidth to half the size of the 
IK optimal bandwidth and increasing it to twice as large produces similar results. Lastly, 
local linear regressions estimated with and without covariates also produce similar 
results. If the inclusion of covariates changes the significance or sign of the estimated 
LATE, this may indicate misspecification of the FRD or a potential discontinuity in one 
or more covariates. While our specification tests indicate valid FRD design, the estimated 
treatment effects for BMI, Body Fat, and WtH Ratio are all insignificant.  
Summary and Conclusions  
The National School Lunch Program is one of the largest food-assistance programs in the 
United States, providing lunch for over 31 million students (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2012). Recent research suggests that the NSLP may not provide nutritious 
meals and at least one-third of schools do not meet compliance set by the Dietary 
Guidelines of America (Gleason & Suitor 2003; Campbell et al. 2011; Crepinsek et al. 
2009). With childhood obesity close to 17 percent for two- to nineteen-year olds, it is 
imperative to understand how participation in the NSLP may be impacting childhood 
obesity.  
Previous studies have shown that participation in the NSLP contributes to childhood 
obesity, most likely through the high fat and calorie content of the school lunch as well as 
due to selection on unobservables. However, when the sample is limited to low-income 
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participants, participation in the NSLP reduces the occurrence of obesity. This paper adds 
to the economics literature in two ways.  First, we estimate an individual’s obesity using 
BMI, percent body fat and waist to height ratio because BMI may not always be the best 
measure of body composition. Second, we use the same sample across four different 
econometric approaches, allowing for a better comparison of results. Results are mixed. 
Using OLS regression, the estimated effect of participation on obesity (measured by BMI, 
Body Fat, and WtH Ratio) is less than 1 percentage point; using a recursive bivariate 
probit model, participation in the NSLP increases the probability of being obese by 
between 9 and 18 percentage points. When strong normality distributions are removed, 
these estimates reverse sign: under MIV and MTS assumptions, participation in the 
NSLP at worst decreases the probability of being obese 5 percentage points; estimation of 
a local average treatment effect around the income-eligibility threshold of 185 percent of 
the poverty line indicates that participation in the NSLP decreases the probability of 
being obese by a statistically insignificant 78 percentage points.  
The causal relationship between participation in the NSLP and rates of childhood obesity 
is still unclear, partly due to concerns about the validity of each model. The simplistic 
OLS regression does not account for the endogeneity of participation, however the more 
complex bivariate probit model requires a valid instrument to correctly identify the causal 
effect and results may depend heavily on the strong distributional assumptions. 
Unfortunately, even the most “innocuous” assumption of conditional mean monotonicity 
is not supported by the data, thus potentially invalidating the nonparametric MIV bounds. 
The fuzzy regression discontinuity model results are only valid around the “full-price” 
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lunch income cutoff of 185 percent of the poverty line and thus are not comparable to the 
other three models. These conclusions underscore the complexity in determining a causal 
effect of the NSLP on childhood obesity. Future research may focus on determining the 
precise mechanism through which the school lunch program has an effect on obesity.  
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Table 2.1. Variables 
Variable   
Measures of Obesity  
BMI 
Individual Body Mass Index (BMI) is greater than 
age/gender specific cutoff for obese (Yes or No) 
  
Body Fat 
Individual percent body fat is greater than 30% for obese  
(Yes or No) 
  
WtH Ratio 
Individual waist to height ratio is greater than .50 for obese  
(Yes or No) 
  Individual Characteristics   
NSLP 
Individual participates in National School Lunch Program 
(NSLP) five days per week (Yes or No) 
  Age Individual's age (years)  
  Gender Individual's gender (Male or Female) 
  
Race 
Individual's race (Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, 
Mexican American, and Other) 
Health Indicators  
Birth Weight Individual’s weight at birth (lbs)  
  
Daily Television Use  
Average hours per day individual spends watching TV  
(Less than 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5+ hours) 
  
Daily Computer use 
Average hours per day individual spends using the computer  
(Less than 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5+ hours) 
Household Demographics  
Education 
Education level of female household reference (Less than 
high school, high school diploma or GED, some college,  
college graduate or above) 
  
Income/Poverty 
Ratio of household income to federal poverty line (e.g. 1 = 
household income is at poverty line) 
  
Marital Status 
Marital status of household reference (Married,  
divorced or separated, other) 
  
Survey Year 
Year of questionnaire and medical examination  




















NSLP Participant 40.30% 100.00%  0.00% 65.00% *** 58.80% 
 
(0.016) -  - (0.024)  (0.016) 
        NSLP Non-Participant 59.70% 0.00%  100.00% 35.00% *** 41.20% 
 
(0.016) -  - (0.024)  (0.016) 
        Obese 14.80% 16.10% *** 12.90% 100.00% *** 0.00% 
 
(0.006) (0.007)  (0.008) -  - 
        High Percent Body Fat 16.80% 16.40% *** 17.30% 69.40% *** 7.60% 
 
(0.007) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.023)  (0.007) 
        Large Waist to Height Ratio 29.20% 29.90% *** 28.20% 97.80% *** 17.20% 
 
(0.009) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.005)  (0.010) 
        Age 10.577 10.425 *** 10.831 10.689 *** 10.551 
 
(0.050) (0.056)  (0.090) (0.082)  (0.059) 
        Birth Weight 7.325 7.29 *** 7.384 7.514 *** 7.283 
 
(0.025) (0.034)  (0.035) (0.049)  (0.026) 
        Household Income/Poverty 2.52 2.156 *** 3.131 2.19 *** 2.593 
 
(0.053) (0.054)  (0.060) (0.065)  (0.053) 
        Race 














            Mexican American 12.30% 53.90% *** 70.80% 56.60% *** 61.40% 
 
(0.018) (0.033)  (0.026) (0.036)  (0.029) 
            Other 12.20% 12.50%  11.70% 11.50%  12.30% 
 
(0.011) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.012) Household Education 





















        continued… 
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Household Education (continued) 
    College Graduate 22.90% 25.70% *** 10.90% 22.90% ** 19.20% 
 
(0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.021)  (0.016) 
        Number of Observations 6,410 4,208  2,202 1,039  5,371 
Notes: Estimates are weighted appropriately for survey design and standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) indicate mean is significantly 
different than non-obese or non-participant population at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 2.3. OLS Regression Results 
  
Measure of Obesity 




















       Individual Characteristics  













       Gender (Omitted: Female) 













       Race (Omitted: White, non-Hispanic) 







































       Health Indicators 













       Daily TV Use (Omitted: Less than 1) 




















































































Table 2.3 (continued). OLS Regression Results 
  
Measure of Obesity 







Daily Computer use (Omitted: Less than 1) 















































































       Household Demographics 













       Education (Omitted: Less than High School) 

































       Marital Status (Omitted: Married) 


























       Survey Year (Omitted: 2001- 2002) 


























       continued… 
 
 53 
Table 2.3 (continued). OLS Regression Results 
  
Measure of Obesity 







Survey Year (continued; Omitted: 2001- 2002) 








































Notes: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance 
levels, respectively. Estimates shown are not weighted; there was no significant difference between 
weighted and non-weighted results. Similar results are found when controlling for only individual 





Table 2.4. Recursive Bivariate Probit Model Results 
  Measure of Obesity 





Explanatory Variable xxx BMI NSLP xxx Body Fat NSLP xxx WtH Ratio NSLP 












































































































































































Table 2.4 (continued). Recursive Bivariate Probit Model Results 
  Measure of Obesity 





Explanatory Variable xxx BMI NSLP xxx Body Fat NSLP xxx WtH Ratio NSLP 







































































































          Rho  -0.412  -0.481  -0.484** 
  (0.189)  (0.356)  (0.151) 
           NSLP Marginal Effect  0.117***  0.090***  0.183*** 
  (0.081)  (0.073)  (0.116) 
          Number of Observations  5,546  5,203  5,493 
          Log-Likelihood  -5,796.35  -5,136.62  -6,391.58 
          Chi-Square  996.2  1,137.15  1,123.80 
    (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001) 
Notes: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance 
levels, respectively. Estimates shown are not weighted; there was no significant difference between 
weighted and non-weighted results. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Survey year is 
included in the model but not reported. The following categorical variable levels are omitted to prevent 
multicollinearity: Gender (Female), Race (White, non-Hispanic), Daily Television or Computer Use (Less 









Body Fat  WtH Ratio 
Worst Case 
 
[ -0.574 , 0.426 ] 
 
[ -0.595 , 0.405 ]  [ -0.539 , 0.461 ] 
                   IV 
 
[ -0.268 , 0.236 ] 
 
[ -0.310 , 0.107 ]  [ -0.195 , 0.205 ] 
                   MIV 
 
[ -0.548 , 0.243 ] 
 
[ -0.572 , 0.137 ]  [ -0.517 , 0.228 ] 
                   MTS 
 
[ -0.574 , 0.006 ] 
 
[ -0.595 , -0.037 ]  [ -0.539 , -0.016 ] 
                   MIV + MTS 
 
[ -0.548 , -0.054 ] 
 
[ -0.572 , -0.147 ]  [ -0.517 , -0.098 ] 
Notes: Bounds found with appropriately weighted estimates. Income/Poverty Ratio is used as IV and MIV. 
To insure non-empty sets, the sample was divided into 20 groups. Similar results occur when the sample is 
only divided into 10 groups. Standard errors were not calculated. 
 
 
Table 2.6. Regression Discontinuity Results 












































    Baseline Covariates 






















  Notes: Each row represents a separate regression. Number of observations in each regression is 5,907. No 
covariates are included, although results are similar when covariates for age, race, and gender are included. 

































0 1 2 3 4 5




















0 1 2 3 4 5
Large Waist to Height Ratio
Income to Poverty Ratio














WHAT’S FOR LUNCH? DETERMINANTS OF THE 
NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM MENU 
I. Introduction Equation Section 3 
The last decade has brought increased scrutiny by nutrition advocates, policy makers, and 
school lunch personnel over the role of the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) on 
the rising rates of childhood overweight and obesity. Advocates of the NSLP say that the 
program provides equal or better nutrition than what would be provided otherwise. 
However, research on the nutritional quality of the NSLP is equivocal. It appears that 
school lunches provide a larger lunch in terms of grams of food, but also provide more 
essential vitamins and minerals than lunches from home (Gleason & Suitor 2003; Gordon 
et al. 2007b; Campbell et al. 2011). For low-income students coming from households 
unable to provide breakfast or dinner, participating in the NSLP may reduce malnutrition 
and be beneficial to overall health. For other students, the NSLP may contribute to 
obesity but only by a small amount. Gunderson, Kreider and Pepper (2012) found that for 
participants with a household income no greater than 130% of the poverty line, the NSLP 
reduced rates of food insecurity, poor health, and obesity.  
Opponents of the NSLP say that the program is not in line with the Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans. The Healthy Meals for Healthy Americas Act required all school lunches 
“conform to Dietary Guidelines for Americans” (P.L. 103-448 1994) by 1996, but as late 
as 2005, only one-third of schools met the guidelines (Gordon et al. 2007a). Two 
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analyses using longitudinal data suggest that fifth grade students participating in the 
NSLP are more likely to be obese than non-participants, controlling for weight in 
kindergarten (Schanzenbach 2009; Millimet, Tchernis, & Husain 2010). However, 
analyzing the long-term effects of participation in the NSLP, Hinrichs (2010) observes no 
significant effects on health after ten years.  
Little research has examined the differences in what is served as a NSLP lunch among 
school districts, although differences are well documented (Gordon et al. 2007a; Levine 
2008; Poppendieck 2010). School districts must comply with federal guidelines defining 
a qualifying school lunch, but decisions on the quality and quantity of food choices is left 
to the district and is determined in part by food availability, budgetary restrictions, and 
student preference. This paper focuses on the relationship between school district income 
and the variety of entrees, fruit, and vegetables available to NSLP participants.  
I construct a unique dataset of 816 current school lunch menus collected from publically 
available school websites. To analyze what types of schools may be more likely to serve 
more healthful foods as part of a school lunch, these data are combined with school- and 
district-level data from the Common Core Data (CCD), county-level income and 
educational attainment data from the American Community Survey (ACS), and state-
level data from School Health Policies and Programs (SHPPS). An increase in household 
income at the county level increases the number of entrees offered per week. This income 
effect is greatest in the wealthiest school districts. Additionally, there is weak evidence of 
positive income effects on the number of fruits and vegetables served as well. The paper 
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proceeds as follows. Section II provides a review of the relevant literature. Section III 
develops a theoretical model suggesting possible avenues through which income may 
affect district menu composition. Section IV discusses in depth the new dataset used to 
generate the estimates. Section V presents model specifications, Section VI provides 
results, and Section VII concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
Amendments to the National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Act in the 1960s and 
‘70s ensured that federal subsidies were allocated equally across states and that states 
provided free and reduced price lunches for those in need, regardless of race or gender. 
More recent policy changes have focused on mandating minimum nutrition standards. 
Even with these amendments, differences in state and local spending practices create 
inequalities in school lunch menus across schools. For instance, kitchen facilities differ 
across schools. In the 2004/05 school year, the School Nutrition Dietary Assessment 
Study III (SNDA-III) conducted by the Food and Nutrition Service estimates that 70 
percent of schools prepare meals on-site, while 19 percent of schools receive “fully or 
partially prepared meals from a base or central kitchen” (Gordon et al. 2007a). The 
remaining 11 percent of schools prepare meals for students at that school as well as other 
schools.  
School food authorities (SFA) work within school districts to provide non-profit food 
services, including the NSLP, while meeting food, labor, and indirect costs. For example, 
an SFA may administer food service for a school district with five elementary schools, 
 
 62 
two middle schools and a high school. The SFA is responsible for determining the total 
number of free-, reduced-, and paid-priced lunches, collecting federal, state, and local 
reimbursements, and creating menus that meet or exceed federal guidelines. SFAs usually 
create one menu for each school-level, e.g. one menu for all five elementary schools.   
Food costs account for 46 percent of reported costs, labor accounts for 45 percent, and 
indirect costs account for the remainder (Bartlett, Glantz, & Logan 2008). When the full 
cost of a lunch exceeds the sum of the paid price and subsidy, school districts must pay 
the balance. A study on the cost of school meals in 2004 estimates that school districts 
cover 19 percent of the total cost of food service (Bartlett, Glantz, & Logan 2008).12 For 
cash-strapped school districts, this may make it difficult to provide a nutritious lunch. 
Like providing any service, school districts with more funding may be able to provide 
more nutritious lunches with a larger variety of fruits, vegetables, and entrees.  
A mix of federal, state, and local revenues fund public schools. Local revenues comprise 
about 45 percent of total revenue per school district (Cornman, Young, & Herrell 2012). 
In 2007, property taxes administered at the school district level accounted for 34 percent 
of public school funding, leading to large variations in expenditures per student across 
states and school districts (Chetty & Friedman 2010). For instance, 2010 current 
expenditures per student averaged $10,652 but ranged from $6,452 in Utah to $20,910 in 
Washington, DC (Cornman, Young, & Herrell 2012). Allocation of these expenditures 
                                                
12 In this study, food service includes all school nutrition programs, including the School Breakfast 
Program and the National School Lunch Program.  
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are determined by the school district and thus indirectly by the voting public who either 
elect officials or vote directly on public spending legislation.  
Federal guidelines require cafeterias to offer at least one fruit, vegetable, grain/bread, 
meat/meat alternative, and milk daily. In order to qualify as a reimbursable lunch, a 
student must select at least three components, one of which must be either a fruit or a 
vegetable. The concept of offering more food components than students are obligated to 
select is called “offer versus serve” (OVS). Introduced as an option at high schools and 
middle schools in 1977, OVS was a way to cut down on food costs and food waste, as 
students were less likely to select items they did not intend to eat. OVS was phased into 
elementary schools in 1981 (Poppendieck 2010).  
Although offering one meat/meat alternative is sufficient for reimbursement, most 
schools offer two or more per day (Gordon et al 2007b). Offering multiple entrees can 
increase participation by appealing to a larger range of students.13 This is also true of 
vegetables and fruits. Behavioral economics research has shown that offering a choice of 
fruits increased the amount of fruits purchased (Just & Wansink 2009). Additional 
research on plate waste (the quantity of edible food not eaten at lunch) suggests that 
choosing from a selection of fruits and vegetables reduces plate waste by allowing 
students to select what they prefer (Buzby & Guthrie 2002).  
                                                
13 The meat/meat alternative food component must be offered as an entrée (e.g. Chicken nuggets or yogurt 
and cheese stick.) Entrées can also provide the bread or starch component of the meal (e.g. Hamburger with 
Bun or Pepperoni Pizza)  
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Opponents of the new NSLP nutrition guidelines worry that requiring schools to offer 
more types of vegetables will increase costs of the meal without increasing the 
healthfulness of what is actually consumed. These concerns may be unfounded: using 
menu and dietary intake data available for 397 elementary and secondary schools in the 
SNDA-III study, Newman (2012) evaluates the effect on consumption of offering healthy 
foods. The author uses tobit regressions to estimate whether students attending schools 
offering more whole grains, vegetables and fruits actually consume more of these items 
while controlling for student, family, and school characteristics such as age, BMI, 
household income, and school enrollment. She finds that offering more whole grains, 
dark green vegetables, and red-orange vegetables leads to increased consumption of these 
items. However, these results did not hold for schools offering more fruits. 
Offering more vegetable, fruit, and entrée options may increase participation, providing 
greater revenues. It can also reduce plate waste and increase the healthfulness of food 
choices. The options offered ultimately are determined by the demand for school lunch 
and the school district’s and SFA’s ability to provide a healthy lunch on a given budget. 
A theoretical model is presented in the next section. 
III. Theory 
While the large majority of each SFA’s food service revenue comes from federal 
reimbursements, individual states and districts may choose to provide additional revenue 
towards food service. For example, the SFA’s city or town through a tax, e.g. property 
tax, may collect local revenue. The proportion of taxes given to the education budget and 
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specifically to the production of school meals depends on local preferences and political 
environment. If the opportunity costs of collecting additional local revenues are too great, 
an SFA will choose to rely solely on federal and state funds.  
Allow the SFA to act in the best interest of the students, aiming to provide a nutritious 
meal while following the federal guidelines for a reimbursable meal. Let xi be a food 
component of a NSLP lunch, where i = 1 for fruit, = 2 for vegetable, = 3 for grain/bread, 
= 4 for meat/meat alternative, or = 5 for milk. The SFA gains utility from offering these 
components daily: U x1,..., x5( ) . The SFA raises additional revenue through local 
chartable donations and tax revenues. The political cost associated with raising revenue is 
C(R, Y), a function of revenue, R, and local income, Y. This cost increases as more 
revenues are raised, such that !C !R > 0 . In addition, raising local raising revenue 
becomes less difficult in wealthier areas: !C !Y < 0 .   
The SFA maximizes utility less political costs, subject to budget constraints and federal 
nutrition guidelines: 
(3.1)   max
x1,...,x5{ }






xi "1  # i
  
Revenue is the sum of the product of all food components, xi, and their respective prices, 
pi. For simplicity I assume that each component i can be priced individually; however, 
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NSLP meals are not actually bought a la carte. Consider pii=1
5!  the total price of a 
school meal, including both the federal reimbursement (for all meals) and the student 
contribution (for reduced- and paid-price lunches). In order to receive reimbursement, the 
SFA must provide at least one of each component daily, thus the five inequality 
constraints. 
The Lagrangian function and first order conditions are presented below.  









#   








" # pi $ 0 = 0 if xi >1( )  % i   
(3.4)   !L
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= R # pixi
i=1
5
$ = 0  
(3.5)   !L
!µi
= xi  " i  
Equation 3.3 illustrates that the marginal utility gained from providing xi, for example 
fruits (i=1), is less than or equal to the price of p1 plus the marginal political cost of 
providing fruits as part of a reimbursable meal. Each SFA will choose the optimal 
number of fruits, x1
* , on the budget line. If the cost of providing an additional fruit 
outweighs the marginal benefit, the SFA will only offer one fruit daily. Consider two 
SFAs choosing the optimal number of fruits. They both face the same prices, but one 
district is wealthier than the other. Given that !C !Y < 0 , the poorer SFA may only be 
able to offer one fruit per day while the wealthier SFA offers two.  
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The National School Lunch Program is a federally funded program providing equal 
subsidy rates nationwide. The theoretical model presented above shows how local 
funding sources such as taxes and bake sales allow wealthier school districts to offer a 
greater number of fruits, vegetables, entrees, etc. than their low-income counterparts 
through reducing the marginal political cost of providing an additional food component. 
The next section describes the unique dataset I collected to tests this empirically. 
IV. Data 
Data are collected from four sources: current district and school websites, Common Core 
Data, the School Health Policies and Programs Study, and the American Community 
Survey. Table 3.1 provides descriptions of each variable and its source. The study use 
menu data from elementary schools only because they offer fewer a la carte options (food 
choices that are available for purchase outside of a qualifying NSLP lunch) than middle 
or high schools and a larger percent of K-5 students typically participate in the NSLP 
than middle or high school students (Gordon et al. 2007a; Fox & Condon 2012). Schools 
were chosen in three stages. First, to provide a sample representing a large number of 
students, a school from the largest district (in terms of enrollment) in each state was 
randomly selected. Second, to ensure income variability within the sample, the sampling 
frame was split into deciles based on county-level income and 61 schools were randomly 
selected from each decile. Third, to ensure within-state income variability, a school from 
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of each state was selected. Because menus are almost 
always created at the district level, no more than one school per district is sampled.  
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School district data are collected from the Common Core Data (CCD). The Department 
of Education collects data on all public elementary and secondary schools in the country, 
thus providing the initial sampling frame for menu collection as well as providing 
information about the chosen school districts and schools. The most recent district-level 
data available are from the CCD District Survey 2010/11 school year. Variables include 
the proportion of white, non-Hispanic enrolled students (White), proportion of black, non-
Hispanic enrolled students (Black), proportion of Hispanic enrolled students (Hispanic), 
proportion of other enrolled students (Other)14, and whether the district is located in a 
predominately urban, suburban/town, or rural area (Urban, Suburban, and Rural, 
respectively). Total enrollment (Enrollment) measures the total number of students in 
each district. Household income (Eligible) is measured at the district-level by the 
proportion of enrolled students eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch (i.e. the 
proportion of students from households that fall below 185 percent of the poverty line).  
Menus from the 2012/13 school year were compiled by accessing each school’s website. 
Websites are a cost-effective way to disseminate information to parents. Most school 
districts include a current cafeteria menu to promote the NSLP and encourage 
participation. Schools and/or school districts post monthly menus either in addition to or 
as a substitute for sending paper lunch menus home with each student (see Appendix F 
for an example). Often, menus are removed from the website at the end of the month so 
that only the current month is available. I collected menus at three different times: 
August/September 2012, October/November 2012, and April/May 2013. I selected the 
                                                
14 Other includes Asian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, Samoan, and mixed-race students. 
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first five-day week of the current month and recorded the complete menu, including 
vegetarian options and salad bars if available. Foods were then categorized by type and 
the total number of entrées (Total Entrée), fruits (Total Fruit), and vegetables (Total 
Vegetable) served each week was calculated. When possible, Total Vegetable was further 
categorized into mutually exclusive subgroups, Green Vegetable, Red/Orange Vegetable, 
Legume, Starchy Vegetable, and Other Vegetable. These categories coincide with the 
USDA’s current lunch guidelines and will be used as outcome variables in the 
regressions presented below.15 On average, 67 percent of each district’s vegetables can be 
categorized within the vegetable subgroups. Some menus do not list the specific type of 
vegetable served; i.e., a menu listing “Vegetable” would be counted as one vegetable in 
Total Vegetable, but would not be included in the vegetable subgroup analysis. 
Combination vegetables such as “Peas and Carrots” are counted as one vegetable in Total 
Vegetable but, to maintain mutual exclusivity, are not included in the vegetable 
subgroups.  
In addition, the month each menu was sampled is included to capture potential timing 
differences due to food seasonality or lags in implementing the new NSLP guidelines. Let 
Month1=1 if the menu is from August/September 2012 and 0 otherwise. Month2 and 
Month3 are defined similarly for October/November 2012 and April/May 2013, 
respectively.  
                                                




District-level variables are matched to county-level variables from the American 
Community Survey 5-year estimates to find median household income and adult 
education attainment (Attained BA) of the school’s county. Let Income be the median 
household income of the school district county divided by 10,000. School district 
boundaries do not necessarily coincide with county boundaries: while only one school is 
sampled from each district, there are sometimes multiple districts per county.16 For 
example, Cook County, Illinois is home to 9 school districts, including City of Chicago 
Public Schools. The median household income for Cook County is $51,457. However, 
Eligible ranges from 0.08 in the suburban Arlington Heights School District to 0.84 in the 
suburban Cicero School District. The City of Chicago School District has the largest 
enrollment in Cook County and Eligible is 0.76. Thus, Income may not always provide an 
accurate estimate of the household income of each district’s enrolled students. For this 
reason, both Income and Eligible are used as measures of school district wealth. Based on 
the theoretical model, I expect a positive relationship between each dependent variable 
and Income and a negative relationship between each dependent variable and Eligible.  
The average median county income in the sample is $50,664 and the average proportion 
of students with household income below 185 percent of the poverty line is 0.46.  On 
average, 26 percent of adults in the district hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. The 
sample includes wide range of school districts in terms of student enrollment: the 
smallest district has 69 enrolled students and the largest district has 667,273 enrolled 
students. On average, 62 percent of the students are considered white, 13 percent 
                                                
16 The most extreme example of this is Los Angeles County with 17 sampled districts.  
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considered black, 17 percent considered Hispanic, and 8 percent considered other races.  
Almost half of the districts sampled are identified as suburban, 27 percent are rural 
districts, and 25 percent are identified as urban.  
Menus from some randomly selected schools were not available for one of four reasons 
(Fig. 3.1). First, some school districts choose not to post menus. This issue was more 
prevalent at lower income schools, but occurred at all income decile. Second, the school 
menu was posted but was out of date (not in the 2012/13 school year). This occurred 
most frequently at the poorest school districts. Third, no school or school district website 
could be found. Possible reasons may be out of date information on school closings. 
Lastly, an abundance of school holidays, half-days, and teacher workdays may mean that 
a posted menu does not include at least one 5-day week and therefore cannot be used. 
These school districts were removed from the random sample and others were selected in 
their place.  
State-level policies may affect district and school level management decisions regarding 
menu choices. The School Health Policies and Programs (SHPPS) database provides 
information regarding nutritional policies in schools. The CDC collects these data every 
five to six years; the most recent SHPPS data are from 2006. Relevant to this analysis are 
three state policies requiring or recommending that schools offer students a choice 
between two or more different lunch entrées, fruits, or vegetables daily (Entrée Policy, 
Fruit Policy, and Vegetable Policy). Additionally, some states require each district 
provide a coordinator to oversee all food service (Coordinator) and some states require 
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schools to prohibit access to vending machines for at least part of the day (Vending).17 
Lastly, each state was assigned to one of four geographic regions (North, Midwest, South, 
or West). Thirty-two percent of sampled districts are located in the south, 27 percent in 
the Midwest, 22 percent in the western United States, and 19 percent in the north.  
V. Methods 
The theoretical model outlined in Section III suggests that the income level of a SFA in 
part determines an individual district’s demand for menu components such as entrees, 
fruits, and vegetables. I use multiple income specifications to test income effects on the 
total number of entrées, fruits, and vegetables served per week. As a sensitivity analysis 
for the effect of income on the number of vegetables served weekly, I use vegetable 
subgroups defined in the previous section. Five models using various income 
specifications are evaluated for each dependent variable: 1) Income cubed, 2) natural log 
of Income, 3) Income dummy variables, 4) Eligible, and 5) Eligible dummy variables. 
The sixth and seventh models use median regression to evaluate the effect of Income and 
Eligible on Total Entrée, Total Fruit, and Total Vegetable.  
Covariates are added to all models to control for education-level of the adults in each 
district, district-level race, urbanicity and size, geographic region, the month of sampling, 
and district food policies. This section describes the models used for all eight dependent 
                                                




variables. Additional income specifications can be found in Appendix D. Descriptive 
statistics and results follow in Section VII. 
Ordinary least squares regression is used on the eight menu components collected from 
the school menu data. Let xi be the total number of entrées, fruits, vegetables, dark green 
vegetables, red/orange vegetables, legumes, starchy vegetables, or other vegetables 
served in district i. Income is the median household income in district i, divided by 
10,000. Let Si be a vector of characteristics for the ith school district: parental education 
(Attained BAi), race (Blacki, Hispanici, Otheri; Whitei omitted), urbanicity (Suburbani, 
Rurali; Urbani omitted), region (Midwesti, Southi, Westi; Northi omitted), and the natural 
log of Enrollment. The natural log of enrollment is used because adding one additional 
student may have a greater impact on xi in smaller school districts due to economies of 
scale. All variables are described fully in Section IV and in Table 3.1. Let Di be a vector 
of three state-level nutrition policies: Coordinatori, Vendingi, and Policyi.  The variable 
Policyi is Entrée Policy when xi=Total Entree, Fruit Policy when xi=Total Fruit, and 
Vegetable Policy for all other equations. Vector Mi contains variables indicating which 
month the menu was sampled (Month2i, Month3i; Month1i omitted). Models 1, 2, and 3 
are defined by equation 3.6: 
(3.6)   E xi Incomei ,Si ,Di ,Mi( ) =! + f Incomei( ) + "# Si + "$ Di + "% Mi  . 
A perfectly linear relationship between income and entrée choices is unlikely, so Model 1 
defines f Incomei( ) = !1Incomei + !2Incomei2 + !3Incomei3 . Results using Income to the 
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second and fourth power are similar and are included in Appendix D. As is typical of 
U.S. income estimates, the distribution of Income is right-skewed (Fig. 3.2). Taking the 
natural log corrects this skew and a few high-income outliers. Thus Model 2 defines 
f Incomei( ) = !1LnIncomei , where LnIncome is the natural log of the median household 
income in district i’s county. Note that in this case, household income is not divided by 
10,000.18 Model 3 provides another flexible form for Income: let f Incomei( ) = !Incom "ei
where Incom !ei is a vector of dummy variables such that  
  
The base level, Income1,i is excluded from the model so that the coefficient on Income2,i, 
β2, measures the effect of district i moving from a median household income of less than 
$35,000 to a median household income between $35,000 and $45,000. Note that the 
remaining dummy variables are not bounded from above; the variables overlap to 
measure the pseudo-marginal effect of an increase in income. For example, when Total 
Entrée is the dependent variable xi, a positive coefficient β3 implies moving from a 
median household income between $35,000 and $45,000 to an income between $45,000 
and $55,000 increases the number of entrees offered weekly.  
                                                
18 Results using LnIncome2 are provided in Appendix D. 
Income1,i = 1  if Income ! 3.5;   else 0
Income2,i = 1  if Income > 3.5;   else 0
Income3,i = 1  if Income > 4.5;   else 0
Income4,i = 1  if Income > 5.5;   else 0
Income5,i = 1  if Income > 6.5;   else 0
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Models 4 and 5 use Eligible to measure the income of school district i instead of the 
median household income; f Eligiblei( )  replaces f Incomei( )  in the regression equation: 
(3.7)     E xi Eligiblei ,Si ,Di ,Mi( ) =! + f Eligiblei( ) + "# Si + "$ Di + "% Mi  . 
Recall that Eligible is the proportion of students in school district i with household 
income less than 185 percent of the poverty line. The federal poverty line is determined 
annually and increases with family size. In 2013, 185 percent of the poverty line for a 
family of four was $43,567.50. In Model 4, I define f Eligiblei( ) = !1Eligiblei . Model 5 
uses dummy variables similar to Model 3: let f Eligiblei( ) = !Eligiblei  where  
is a vector of dummy variables such that 
 
As in Model 3, these dummy variables are not mutually exclusive. Again the base level, 
Eligible1,i is excluded from the model and the coefficients are considered pseudo-
marginal effects of moving from just below the cut-off to just above.  
The final models move away from standard OLS regression techniques to quantile 
regression. Median-quantile regression can be helpful to use in cases when the 
distribution of the outcome variable is highly skewed and the median is more informative 
than the mean. Instead of finding a conditional-mean function using least squares 
Eligibl !ei
Eligible1,i = 1  if Eligible ! 0.20;   else 0
Eligible2,i = 1  if Eligible > 0.20;   else 0
Eligible3,i = 1  if Eligible > 0.40;   else 0
Eligible4,i = 1  if Eligible > 0.60;   else 0
Eligible5,i = 1  if Eligible > 0.80;   else 0
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estimation, quantile regression finds a conditional-median function using least absolute 
distance estimation (Koenker 2005). Models 6 and 7 are only used to evaluate Total 
Entrée, Total Fruit, and Total Vegetable due to the limited observations in each vegetable 
subgroup.  
Let the median-quantile function of xi be Q(xi). Models 6 and 7 are conditioned on 
vectors Si, Di, and Mi. Model 6 also includes the vector of dummy variables Incomei and 
Model 7 includes the vector of dummy variables Eligiblei. 
(3.8)     Q xi Incomei ,Si ,Di ,Mi( ) =! + "# Incomei + "$ Si + "% Di + "& Mi + Fui'1 q( )   
and 
(3.9)     Q xi Eligiblei ,Si ,Di ,Mi( ) =! + "# Eligiblei + "$ Si + "% Di + "& Mi + Fui'1 q( )   
The distribution of the error term on the median is Fui
!1 0.50( ) . If the error term is not 
identically distributed, (e.g. due to heteroskedasticity),  Q i( )  will vary in slope and 
intercept across quantiles. Complete regression results are provided for the median 
quantile and compared to results in Models 3 and 5 to see if OLS results are biased. 
VI. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The average number of entrées offered during the sampled week is 12, or more than two 
per day.  While all elementary school menus included at least one entrée per day, some 
districts offered as many as eight entrees per day (Fig. 3.3). Vegetables and fruits are 
 
 77 
offered less often: in an average week, 10 vegetable sides and 7 fruit sides are offered. 
Six school menus did not include any vegetables sides and 23 did not include any fruits 
sides. Either these schools are not following the weekly meal patterns required of a 
reimbursable meal or the school district does not publish daily vegetable and fruit 
choices. Without any further information, I assume that the published menu is correct.  
On average, elementary school districts offer one green vegetable, one legume, 1.6 
red/orange vegetables, 1.3 other vegetables, and almost 2 starchy vegetables each week. 
The range of all five vegetable subgroups is large (Fig. 3.4). For example, while most 
menus included one legume each week (60 percent), 179 districts (22 percent) offered no 
legumes and one district offered 20 legumes per week.19 Due to the limited information 
provided on some menus, only 67 percent of all vegetables can be categorized into 
subgroups.  The other 33 percent are either unclassified (e.g. “Salad”) or combination 
vegetables (“Peas and Carrots”). Until a larger sample is collected, or more detailed menu 
information becomes available, regression results with vegetable subgroups should be 
considered preliminary and are available in Appendix C.  However, this dataset can 
provide insight into how SFAs are adjusting to the new weekly meal pattern introduced in 
the 2012/13 school year requiring minimum servings of specific types of vegetables. This 
benefits NSLP participants nutritionally by providing vegetables with different vitamin 
and mineral compositions.  It also is intended to introduce students to a variety of 
                                                
19 Anecdotally, the school districts offering the most number of vegetables provided a salad bar or a 
vegetable station where students could choose among a large selection of daily vegetables.  
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vegetables.  Most of the menus (70 percent) were collected in April or May 2013, eight or 
nine months after the new requirements took effect. 
While SFAs are providing vegetables within each subgroup, the within group variety is 
lacking. Of the vegetables offered and clearly identified, starchy vegetables are the most 
commonly offered (Table 3.4). Twelve percent of all vegetables offered are potatoes 
(including potato products such as French fries) and 5.6 percent is corn. Other starchy 
vegetables, such as green peas and lima beans make up another 2.6 percent of all 
vegetables.  Almost seven percent of all vegetables offered are French fries. 
Red/orange vegetables make up 15.4 percent of all vegetables offered.  Carrots are by far 
the most popular variety: 63 percent of red/orange vegetables are carrots, either cooked or 
raw.  Other vegetables, such as green beans, comprise close to 12 percent of all 
vegetables, while dark green vegetables and legumes comprise 10.1 percent each.  Sixty-
two percent of dark green offered are broccoli (cooked or raw).  
Total Entrees 
Model 1 estimates the effect of income on the number of total entrees served using a 
third-order income specification. Using OLS regression with robust standard errors and 
controlling for education-level of the adults in district i, students’ race, urbanicity, district 
size, region, the month district i’s menu was sampled and district food policies, an 
increase in household income of $10,000 will increase the total number of entrees served 
weekly between 0.53 and 8.03 (Table 3.5). Figure 3.5 displays the marginal effect of 
income graphically.  The blue line traces the marginal effect household income on the 
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total number of entrees served per week across all income levels within the sample.  The 
shaded area represents the pointwise 95 percent confidence band. There is a positive and 
statistically significant income effect at all income levels.  In the poorest districts, a 
$10,000 increase in household income would increase the number of entrees offered 
weekly by 2.54 per week. In the richest districts, a $10,000 increase in income increases 
the number of entrees by 8.03.  School districts in counties with a median household 
income of $55,948 experience the smallest marginal effect: if income increases $10,000, 
the number of entrees offered weekly increases by less than 1.  
Model 2 estimates the effect of income on the total number of entrees served using the 
natural log of income. The income effect is positive and statistically significant (Table 
3.6).  A ten percent increase in household income would increase the number of entrees 
offered weekly by 0.48.  For wealthier school districts, this income effect is smaller than 
estimated in Model 1.  Model 3 estimates income effects using income dummy variables.  
All coefficients are positive but not statistically significant (Table 3.7). A joint F-test 
concludes that Income contributes to the number of entrees served weekly (Appendix E). 
Model 6 evaluates the same functional form for Income ( f Incomei( ) = !" Incomei ) using 
conditional-median instead of conditional-mean regression. As discussed in the previous 
section, the median provides a better measure of central tendency than the mean for 
highly skewed outcome variables. All but one Income coefficient in Model 6 is positive. 
School districts with household income greater than $65,000 offer 0.12 fewer entrees per 
week than districts with income between $55,000 and $65,000, suggesting decreasing 
returns on income (Table 3.10). These results contradict those in Model 1 but they are 
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also not statistically significant. The joint F-test for Income is not significant when using 
median regression.  
Models 4 and 5 evaluate income effects using the proportion of students from households 
with income less than 185 percent of the poverty line (Eligible). This is of particular 
interest because eligibility in the free or reduced lunch program is set at 185 percent of 
the poverty line. Model 4 estimates that a ten percentage point increase in Eligible 
decreases the number of entrees offered by 0.6 (Table 3.8). Although the data do not tell 
us how many eligible students actually participate and/or consume a school lunch, Model 
4 suggests that districts with more eligible students offer fewer entrees.  
Model 5 estimates the effect of Eligible on Total Entrees using dummy variables. All 
dummy variables are negative and together Eligible contributes to the number of entrees 
offered weekly (Table 3.9; Appendix E). School districts where 20 to 40 percent of 
students eligible for free or reduced lunch offer 2.4 fewer entrees per week than districts 
with less than 20 percent of eligible students (Table 3.9). The income effect is slightly 
larger when using conditional-median regression; the same school districts offer 3.0 
fewer entrees per week (Model 7, Table 3.11). 
In Model 5 and 7, districts with between 60 and 80 percent of students eligible for free or 
reduced meals offer a statistically equivalent number entrees per week than districts with 
40 to 60 percent Eligible. This suggests that the additional $0.02/meal subsidy given to 
“high-need” schools serving more than 60 percent free or reduced meals does not have an 
impact on the number of entrée offered weekly. Although we cannot directly compare 
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these effects to those models using Income to measure district wealth, all models 
described above give evidence that the income level of the school district significantly 
impacts the number of entrees served. Additionally, there is evidence that the “high-
need” subsidy does not increase the number of entrees offered weekly.  
Three control variables are statistically significant in each income specification. First, 
school district enrollment has a positive effect on the number of entrees offered weekly, 
suggestive of economies of scale.  Given the same per meal subsidy rate, larger districts 
may be able to produce a larger variety of entrees. Second, districts in states requiring a 
food service coordinator offer more entrees than districts in states without that 
requirement. It is possible that having someone responsible for coordinating food services 
district-wide increases efficiency and allows district to provide a larger number of 
entrees. Third, there are statistically significant differences in the number of entrees 
served in each region of the US.  It is unclear whether this is due to regional differences 
in food access, preference, or something else.   
Total Fruit  
Results for Total Fruit are not as robust as the results for Total Entrée. The signs are as 
expected given the theory presented in Section IV (positive for Income coefficients, 
negative for Eligible coefficients), but not always statistically significant. As seen in 
Figure 3.6, a $10,000 increase in the median household income increases the number of 
fruits offered weekly, but the effect is not statistically different than zero. The estimated 
income effect using the natural log of income is positive and statistically significant: a ten 
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percent increase in household income increases the number of fruits offered weekly by 
0.02 (Table 3.7). Model 3 estimates income effects using income dummy variables. 
When the outcome variable is Total Fruit, the coefficients of the dummy variables are 
progressively larger with income.  However, none are statistically significant and a joint 
F-test rejects the hypothesis that Income contributes to the number of fruits offered 
weekly (Table 3.8). Results are similar in Model 6 using conditional-median regression. 
Evaluating income effects using Eligible as the measure of district income, a ten-
percentage point increase decreases the number of fruits offered by 0.3 (Table 3.9). This 
suggests that districts with more eligible students (and thus, possibly a larger 
participation rate) offer fewer fruits. In support, estimates from Model 5 and 7 indicate 
that as the proportion of students from households with income less than 185 percent of 
the poverty line increases, the number of fruits offered weekly decrease, but not 
significantly.  
Four control variables are consistently significant in all Total Fruit regressions.  First, in 
all but Model 4, suburban school districts offer more fruits per week than urban school 
districts.  Second, larger school districts (in terms of enrolled students) offer more fruits 
per week.  This effect is smaller in magnitude than the marginal effect of enrollment on 
total entrees offered. Third, western states consistently offer the least amount of fruits per 
week. Lastly, October/November 2012 menus list fewer fruits than menus from 




Total Vegetable  
The effect of income, measured at the county level (Income) or district level (Eligible), 
on the number of vegetables offered weekly is not significant in any models. However, 
when Total Vegetables is split into five vegetable subgroups, Dark Green, Red/Orange, 
Legumes, Starchy, and Other, Income does significantly impact the number of dark green 
and red/orange vegetables and legumes served (Appendix C). Model 2 suggests that a 
one-percent increase in household income increases the number of dark green vegetables 
offered weekly by 0.60. A joint F-test on the Income coefficients in Model 3 suggests that 
Income statistically contributes to the number of legumes offered each week (p-
value=0.0883). Additionally, Model 4 indicates that a one-percentage point increase in 
the students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch reduces the number of red/orange 
vegetables offered by almost one.   
Five control variables are consistently significant across all six Total Vegetables models.  
Race contributes to the number of vegetables offered per week.  Specifically, an increase 
in the proportion of black and “other” students relative to white students decreases the 
number of vegetables offered. These results are not consistent if looking at vegetable 
subgroups (Appendix C).  For example, districts with larger proportions of black students 
offer fewer red/orange vegetables but more dark green vegetables.  Like with Total 
Entrees and Total Fruit, an increase in district enrollment increases the number of 
vegetables offered weekly. In addition, districts in the South offer more vegetables than 
northern districts. Overall, Region contributes to the number of vegetables offered. 
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Lastly, districts in states requiring or recommending schools offer two or more vegetables 
daily offer more vegetables per week.  
VII. Conclusion 
While controlling for school district racial profile, urbanicity, enrollment, region, 
education level of adults, and relevant food policies, household income does affect the 
composition of a NSLP reimbursable school lunch. There is strong evidence that 
wealthier districts offer elementary school students more entrée choices per week. There 
is weaker evidence that wealthier districts offer elementary school students more fruits 
and vegetable choices per week. In addition, schools with a higher proportion of students 
eligible to receive free- or reduced-price lunches offer elementary school students fewer 
entrée choices and fruit choices per week.   
Children that are given more options at lunch are more likely to be exposed to foods they 
may not eat at home. If school food authorities are offering foods meeting the weekly 
meal patterns required of a reimbursable lunch, participating in the NSLP may increase 
access to healthy foods and improve participant’s health outcomes.  Moreover, students 
participating at school districts providing more than one fruit or vegetable are often able 
to select more than one of these items, likely increasing fruit and vegetable consumption. 
As discussed in the literature review, research on the relationship between childhood 
obesity and participation in the NSLP has had mixed results. This paper suggests one 
reason may be that while low-income students are more likely to participate in the NSLP 
and be obese, the NSLP menu is systematically different for schools in low-income areas. 
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The empirical section does not address the mechanism underlying these results. Section 
IV describes the various funding sources districts receive for provide school lunch for all 
students interested in participating. Federal funds make up the majority of the NSLP 
funding, but districts can choose to allocate other money as well.  It may be that school 
districts in wealthier areas (or with wealthier students) are more likely to have additional 
funding available for school lunch, allowing SFAs to increase the food choices.  
Increasing the availability of fruits and vegetables will contribute to the NSLP’s aim to 
provide nutritious meals to school-aged children. The following policies may provide 
SFAs incentives to do so: 
1. Increase NSLP funding to low-income schools.  This can be achieved by 
increasing the “high-need” subsidy already given to SFAs serving more than 60 
percent free- and reduced-priced meals. Alternatively or in conjunction with 
increasing the subsidy, the high-need cut off could be set at a lower rate. 
2. Increase NSLP funding to smaller school districts. School districts with fewer 
students may be at a cost disadvantage because of the large fixed costs associated 
with food operations. Creating a lump-sum subsidy to small SFAs may allow 
districts to increase food storage capacity, update kitchen facilities, or provide 
training to food service personnel.   
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3.  Create regional food service agreements. Small school districts may increase 
bargaining power by purchasing food in conjunction with other districts in the 
area.  
 It is unclear through this analysis whether or not elementary schools sampled are 
following the federal requirements of a reimbursable lunch, nor whether wealthy districts 
are providing healthier options than low-income school districts. Future research could 
evaluate the nutritional content of menu options to determine if they are equivalent across 
income levels. Future economic research examining the impact of participation in the 
NSLP on childhood health outcomes should be aware of the implicit (and perhaps 





Table 3.1. Variables 
Variable Definition 
  
Menu Level From District & School Websites August 2012 – May 2013 
     Total Entrée # entrées served per week 
     Total Fruit # fruits served per week 
     Total Vegetable # vegetables served per week 
     Green Vegetable # dark green vegetables served per week 
     Red/Orange Vegetable # red and orange vegetables served per week 
     Legume # legumes served per week 
     Starchy Vegetable # starchy vegetables served per week 
     Other Vegetable # other vegetables served per week 
     Month1 Menu collected in August/September 2012 (Yes, No) 
     Month2 Menu collected in October/November 2012 (Yes, No) 
     Month3 Menu collected in April/May 2013 (Yes, No) 
  
District Level From Common Core Data (CCD) Survey 2010 – 2011 
     Eligible Prop. students eligible for free/reduced price lunch 
     White Prop. white, non-Hispanic enrolled students 
     Black Prop. black, non-Hispanic enrolled students 
     Hispanic Prop. Hispanic enrolled students 
     Other Prop. other enrolled students 
     Urban School located in urban area (Yes, No) 
     Suburban School located in suburban area (Yes, No) 
     Rural School located in rural area (Yes, No) 
     Enrollment # enrolled students as of October 2010 
  
County Level From American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Yr Estimates 2006 - 2010 
     Income Median Household Income in district’s county/10,000 
     Attained BA Prop. adults with Bachelor’s degree or higher 
  
State Level From School Health Policies and Programs (SHPPS) 2006 
     North School district located in the North (Yes, No) 
     Midwest School district located in the Midwest (Yes, No) 
     South      School district located in the South (Yes, No) 
     West School district located in the West (Yes, No) 
     Vending State requires or recommends that schools prohibit 
access to vending machines 
(Require or Recommend, No Policy) 








Table 3.1 (continued). Variables 
Variable Definition 
 
     Entrée Policy State required or recommends that schools offer 
students a choice between 2 or more different lunch 
entrées daily. 
(Require or Recommend, No policy) 
     Fruit Policy State required or recommends that schools offer 
students a choice between 2 or more different fruits 
daily. 
(Require or Recommend, No policy) 
     Vegetable Policy State required or recommends that schools offer 
students a choice between 2 or more different 
vegetables daily. 
(Require or Recommend, No policy) 





Table 3.2. District Demographics 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable xxx Mean xxx Minimum xxx Maximum 
Total Entrée  12.04  5  45 
  
(6.95) 
           Total Fruit 7.19 0 50 
  
(4.28) 
           Total Vegetable 10.19 0 75 
  (4.81)     
       Green Vegetable 1.04 0 10 
  (1.18)     
       Red/Orange Vegetable 1.64 0 11 
  (1.49)     
       Legume 1.04 0 20 
  (1.07)     
       Starchy Vegetable 1.97 0 15 
  (1.31)     
       Other Vegetable 1.25 0 11 
  (1.33)     









































    Month  
     Month1 (Aug/Sept 2012)  0.13  0  1 
  (0.33)     
           Month2 (Oct/Nov 2012) 0.18 0 1 
  (0.39)     
           Month3 (Apr/May 2013) 0.69 0 1 
  (0.46)     
Notes: Number of observations is 816.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  See Table 3.3 for variable 
definitions.     
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Table 3.4. Variety of Vegetables Offered Weekly 
 
 Percent of  
Total Vegetables 
xx Percent of 
Subgroup 
Vegetable Subgroup xxx    
     Dark Green  10.1  - 
     
     Red/Orange  15.4  - 
     
     Legume  10.1  - 
     
     Starchy  20.2  - 
     
     Other  11.6  - 
     
     Combination  6.4  - 
     
     Uncategorized  26.2  - 
          
Specific Vegetable (Subgroup)     
     Broccoli (Green)  5.5  62.5 
     
     Carrot (Red/Orange)  9.8  63.2 
     
     Baked Beans (Legume)  3.4  35.3 
     
     Corn (Starchy)  5.6  30.4 
     
     Potato (Starchy)  12.2  59.4 
     
     Green Beans (Other)  5.4  53.3 
Notes: Number of observations is 810.  Combination vegetables include vegetables from more than one 
subgroup (e.g. “Peas and Carrots”). Uncategorized vegetables could not be defined from the menu (e.g. 
“Vegetable” or “Salad”). See Appendix A for other vegetable definitions. “Potato” includes potato 
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Food Policy is Entrée Policy when 
Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and Vegetable Policy for Total 
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Food Policy is Entrée Policy when 
Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and Vegetable Policy for Total 













xx Entree x Fruit x Vegetable 
Income Dummy (<=3.5 Omitted) 
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Food Policy is Entrée Policy when 
Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and Vegetable Policy for Total 
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Food Policy is Entrée Policy when 
Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and Vegetable Policy for Total 
Vegetables.  Joint F-tests for Income, Race, Urbanicity, Region and Month provided in Appendix E. 
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xx Entree x Fruit x Vegetable 
Eligible Dummy ( <= 0.20 Omitted) 
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Food Policy is Entrée Policy when 
Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and Vegetable Policy for Total 




Table 3.10. Model 6, Median Regression using Income  
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Table 3.10 (continued). Model 6, Median Regression using Income  
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816. Bootstrapped standard errors (400 
replications) are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Food Policy is Entrée Policy when Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and 
Vegetable Policy for Total Vegetables. Joint F-tests for Income, Race, Urbanicity, Region and Month 




Table 3.11. Model 7, Median Regression using Eligible 
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Table 3.11 (continued). Model 7, Median Regression using Eligible 
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Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816. Bootstrapped standard errors (400 
replications) are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Food Policy is Entrée Policy when Total Entrees is the outcome variable, Fruit Policy for Total Fruit and 
Vegetable Policy for Total Vegetables. Joint F-tests for Income, Race, Urbanicity, Region and Month 





Figure 3.1.  Data Collection Issues by Income Strata 
 
 




Figure 3.3. Histogram of Outcome Variables 
 
 




Figure 3.5. Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  
Entrees Offered Weekly 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  




Figure 3.7. Marginal Effect of Median County Income on Number of  






DOES INCOME EFFECT STUDENTS’ CHOICE OF ENTRÉE WITHIN 
NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM MENUS? 
 
Introduction 
The National School Lunch Program (NSLP) is one of the largest nutrition assistance 
programs in the United States, providing free and reduced-price lunches for income-
eligible students as well as minimally subsidizing paid lunches for students that do not 
qualify to receive free or reduce-price lunches. In 2011, over five billion lunches were 
served to an average of 31.7 million students per day (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
2012). When the program was introduced in 1946, the ‘Type A’ qualifying lunch offered 
was designed to provide one-third to one-half of the daily food requirements of a ten- to 
twelve-year-old child (Ralston et al. 2008). As nutritional knowledge progressed over 
time, the Type A lunch was updated to reflect these advancements. New guidelines 
effective beginning in the 2012/13 school year align the required food components of a 
Type A lunch provided by the NSLP with the 2005 Dietary Guidelines for Americans as 
required by the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2012). Specifically, the new guidelines increase the availability of healthful 
foods (fruits, vegetables, and whole grains), while reducing the levels of sodium and 
saturated fats and controlling calorie levels of the offered items. Although schools that 
offer the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) must adhere to the United States 
Department of Agriculture’s guidelines regarding menu offerings, individual schools 
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have the ability to select the components offered on any particular day and generally offer 
several entrée options. The offerings at a given school on a particular day generally differ 
in the nutritional content and healthfulness.  
In this study, we investigate the relationship between income-eligibility status (Free, 
Reduced, or Paid) and entrée selection. As previously indicated, some NSLP participants 
are eligible to receive free lunches, others pay a reduced-cost, and some pay the full-
price. Specifically, students from households with income below or equal to 130 percent 
of the poverty line are eligible to receive free lunches, while students from households 
with household incomes between 130 percent and 185 percent of the poverty line are 
eligible to receive reduced-price lunches; roughly 69 percent of all lunches served are 
free or reduced-price lunches (Food and Nutrition Service 2013a). Students from 
households with household incomes exceeding 185 percent of the poverty line are 
income-ineligible to receive free or reduced-price lunches, but may purchase “full-price” 
lunches.20 Thus the nutritional standards of the NSLP may impact children at all income 
levels. 
Previous research investigating the healthfulness of the NSLP is mixed. Recent studies 
have found positive correlation between participation in the NSLP and child weight 
(Millimet, Tchernis, & Husain 2010; Schanzenbach 2009) and energy consumption 
(Campbell et al. 2011). Gleason and Suitor (2003) estimate that at lunch, NSLP 
participants on average consumed ninety-five percent more sodium than recommended 
                                                
20 In 2012, the poverty line for a family of four was $23,050 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012).   
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while non-participants consumed eighty-eight percent more sodium than recommended. 
The authors also find that relative to non–participants (students presumably bringing 
lunch from home), NSLP participants consume more dietary fat as a percentage of 
calories. A recent study by Hanson and Olson (2013) compares the dietary intake of low-
income NSLP participants and high-income NSLP participants. The authors find that 
while all participants consumed more saturated fats and sodium than non-participants, 
high-income participants had lower saturated fat intake than low-income NSLP 
participants.  
The majority of research concludes that NSLP participants consume more fats and 
sodium than non-participants, which may lead to higher rates of overweight and obesity. 
This is particularly concerning since low-income minorities are both at greater risk for 
obesity and more likely to participate in the NSLP, creating the potential for positive 
selection bias (Ogden & Carroll 2010). Furthermore, differences across income in dietary 
intake among NSLP participants may be an underlying cause of the previous mixed 
results. Using a unique dataset tracking daily entrée choices among students from eleven 
suburban elementary schools in South Carolina, this paper provides a novel approach to 
understanding the healthfulness of the NSLP. 
Using a conditional logit model, we determine whether the nutritional content of an 
entrée affects the likelihood of selecting that entrée and whether the likelihood is 
different across income-eligibility status. Using ordinary least squares regression, we 
determine whether students of different income-eligibility, grade levels, gender, or race 
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systematically make different choices at lunch. We find that students receiving free, 
reduced-, or paid-price meals prefer entrees with more fat, sodium, and protein. Income-
eligibility does affect a student’s choice of entrée: students receiving free lunches are 
more likely to select entrees with more fat and carbohydrates and less protein than 
students purchasing paid-price lunches. While the new NSLP guidelines aim to reduce 
the fat and sodium content of all school lunches offered, students prefer these qualities in 
their foods. In order to better understand the nutritional content actually consumed, 
implementing a school-wide nutritional education curriculum may be necessary.  
Theory and Methods 
Each school district participating in the National School Lunch Program creates a lunch 
menu following the guidelines for a reimbursable lunch set by the USDA. As of July 
2012, the federal guidelines for kindergarten through fifth grade require participating 
schools to offer at least one option for each of the five meal components each day. The 
five meal components that must be offered daily are: 1) meat or meat alternative, 2) bread 
or grain, 3) fruit, 4) vegetable, and 5) milk (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012). Total 
calories per lunch must fall between 550 and 650kcal, and, beginning in the school year 
2014/15, total sodium can be no greater than 640mg per lunch. Districts were given more 
time to meet the new sodium guidelines because it will be challenging for many of the 
existing vendors and suppliers may need to modify their products to meet these standards. 
For a summary of all federal guidelines, see Appendix A. In addition to the federal 
guidelines, South Carolina requires that each school offer at least two different entrees 
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and vegetables and recommends each school offers two or more fruits (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2007). 
The sampled school district’s Food and Nutrition Services Department creates monthly 
school lunch menus that meet federal and state guidelines for a reimbursable lunch. 
Students and parents can access school lunch menus on-line and menus are also sent 
home with each student on a monthly basis. Thus caregivers and students are aware of 
what is being served for lunch in the school cafeteria and can use this information when 
deciding to buy a school lunch or bring one from home. On a typical day, a student has 
three entrée choices, two fruit options, two vegetable options, and milk options to choose 
from (see Appendix F for an example of a monthly menu). In order to be considered a 
qualifying lunch (in which the school is reimbursed by the government), a student must 
select a minimum of three items, one of which must be a fruit or vegetable. Given the 
POS data available, the analysis focuses on a student’s choice of entrée. 
Each student obtains a level of utility from each entrée j served. We assume a student’s 
utility is a function of nutritional qualities of the entrée: calories, fat, sodium, protein, and 
carbohydrates. Consider a student choosing between a turkey sandwich, chicken nuggets, 
and the vegetarian tray (string cheese, yogurt, and graham crackers). The student chooses 
the turkey sandwich if he prefers it to the other two options. The nutritional qualities of 
the entrée directly or indirectly determine his preferences: he chooses the turkey 
sandwich because he wants the option with the lowest amount of fat (and fat directly 
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determines preference) or he likes the option that tastes best (and fat indirectly 
determines preference).  
Let choice set Ci be all entrée options available to student i on a given day. The student 
chooses the entrée that maximizes utility Uij such that the probability of selecting entrée j 
is the probability that the utility from that entrée is greater than utility received from any 
other entrée available: 
(4.1) Pi j Ci( ) = Pr Uij >Uik    ! k "Ci ,  k # j( )   
where 
 
0 ! P j Ci( ) !1    "  j#Ci
P j Ci( )
j#Ci
$ = 1   
Thus, only differences in utility level among choices matter, not the absolute level of 
utility. The level of utility is determined by !Nij , a vector of observed nutritional 
characteristics of each entrée (Calories, Fat, Sodium, Protein, and Carbohydrates) and a 
stochastic component, ϵij. Given a linear utility function, the utility function for the ith 
student choosing entrée j is Uij = !Nij" + # ij  for all j in the choice set Ci.    
Model 1 
The conditional logit model is consistent with the utility maximizing behavior described 
in the random utility model above if the error term is identically and independently 
Gumbel-distributed, F ! ij( ) = exp "e"!ij( ) . We use this model to estimate how the 
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nutritional content of an entrée affects the likelihood that an average student will select 




























where yij is 1 if student i chooses entrée j and 0 otherwise. The assumption in this model 
is that the choice set Ci only includes the three daily entrées offered at the cafeteria. This 
part of the analysis examines POS data and excludes students bringing lunch from home.  
Model 2 
Second, we assume that if there is no POS data for student i on a given day, that student 
has brought a lunch from home and thus Ci includes a fourth generic entrée choice: 
“Home Lunch.” This approach assumes that each student either purchases a lunch or 
brings one from home and does not account for the possibility of a student being absent 
or not eating lunch. Because the true nutritional information for “Home Lunch” is 
unknown, so we assume it has the nutrition content of the average school lunch 
purchased.21 A dummy variable indicating whether a lunch is purchased at school or 
assumed to be brought from home is included in this second model. Let Home=0 when 
student i purchases any entrée at school and Home=1 when student i bring a lunch from 
home. The likelihood ratio is 
                                                










exp #Homeij + $Nij%( )



















The conditional logit model can also illuminate differences across income-eligibility 
status (Free, Reduced, or Paid). In the final model, all nutritional characteristics in !Nij  
are interacted with income-eligibility status to observe differences across our proxy for 
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The choice set Ci in this model includes three entrees served and the option of choosing a 
lunch from home.  
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is used to determine whether income, grade 
level, gender, school location or race impacts the nutritional value of the chosen entrée. 
Let Yj be the total nutrient value in the jth entrée purchased 
(4.5) Yj =! j + "x j# + Schoo "l j$ + % j   
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The model is estimated once for each nutrient in the dataset: Calories, Fat, Sodium, 
Protein, and Carbohydrates. The model includes categorical variables for Race, Status, 
Gender, School, and Grade. The vector !x j includes the grade-level (kindergarten to fifth), 
gender (male and female), income-eligibility (free, reduced, and paid status) and race 
(white, black, Hispanic, and other) of the student purchasing the jth entrée. Let grade-level 
act as a proxy for age and income-status as a proxy for family income. Lastly, a vector of 
dummy variables, Schoo !l j , indicating which elementary school the j
th entrée is 
purchased, is included. There are eleven elementary schools; we maintain confidentiality 
by labeling each school 1 through 11.  
Data 
Data were collected from a suburban district in South Carolina with approximately 
12,500 students in pre-kindergarten to twelfth grade. Student-level daily point of sale 
(POS) data were obtained from the Food and Nutrition Services Department cafeteria 
transaction logs for the period Jan 7, 2013 to April 30, 2013. The data were collected 
after implementation of the new USDA nutritional guidelines. In the cafeteria, students 
complete transactions by entering their unique personal identification number (PIN). The 
PIN is linked to account information regarding lunch price status and available funds; 
parents or students may add money to accounts at any time of the year. We utilized the 
PIN to track student-level purchases over the study period and to match transaction data 
to demographic data.  
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For students purchasing a NSLP qualifying lunch, the cashier enters “Entrée 1”, “Entrée 
2”, or “Vegetarian Entrée” and the student’s account is debited the appropriate amount 
given the student’s income-eligibility status (Free, Reduced, or Paid).22 The entrée 
numbers coincide with the order in which the entrées are listed on the monthly menus. 
The three daily entrees come with a choice of sides; this information is not entered into 
the POS database. Students may also have the opportunity to purchase a la carte foods, 
such as dessert, milk, or chips. These purchases are also recorded. However, the POS 
data on these purchases is not as clearly defined: the cashier may ring up a cookie as 
“Dessert” or use another button with an equivalent price. Furthermore, the manner in 
which these transactions are recorded is not yet standardized at the district-level. We limit 
the sample to elementary schools because they offer fewer a la carte options (food 
choices that are available for purchase outside of a qualifying NSLP lunch) than middle 
or high schools and a larger percent of K-5 students typically participate in the NSLP 
than middle or high school students (Fox & Condon 2012). In the sampled elementary 
schools, a la carte transactions account for less than 0.5 percent of total transactions. 
Given the available data, this paper focuses only on entrée purchases.  
POS data were collected for each school day between January and April 2013 at the 
district’s eleven elementary schools. The district also provided all enrolled students’ race, 
gender, and grade level information. Thus, the dataset includes the race, gender, and 
                                                
22 If parents have a change in income at anytime during the school year, they can apply for a change in 
eligibility.  This occurred for 174 students between January and April.  In these cases, the lowest income 
level is used.  For example, if a student’s status changes from “paid” to “reduced,” the student is considered 
reduced-price lunch status for the entire school year.  
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grade level of all students (including those students that do not have POS data because 
they have not purchased a NSLP lunch or a la carte item) and POS and income eligibility 
status data on students that have purchased a NSLP lunch at least once. If a student does 
not purchase a lunch on a particular day, we assume the child has brought a lunch from 
home.     
Menu offerings are set at the district-level. During the period of investigation, there were 
37 different entrée options offered in rotation. Most entrees provide the meat/meat 
alternative as well as a bread or grain (starch). Five entrees do not include a starch. 
Nutrition information for each of the entrées served (provided by the school district 
nutrition services director) includes total calories (kCal), fat (grams), sodium 
(milligrams), protein (grams), and carbohydrates (grams) per entrée. In some cases, the 
district uses more than one vendor for the same entrée option and it is therefore difficult 
to determine the nutritional information of a specific food item served on a particular day 
at a particular elementary school from the nutritional information provided by the district. 
For food items supplied by multiple vendors, we calculated the median nutritional values 
of each food item and used that value to estimate the calories and nutrients in the entrees 
offered. Once a month, a “Manager’s Choice” entrée is served. On these days, the 
cafeteria managers of each elementary school select the menu and therefore the offerings 
vary across elementary schools. These days are discarded because nutrition content 
information could not be calculated for this option without access to each cafeteria’s 





The spring 2013 semester began on January 7 and POS data were collected through April 
30. In the 66 school days represented in the dataset, 5,592 students purchased 279,698 
school lunches. An additional 187 elementary students never purchased lunch. Table 4.1 
provides summary statistics for the key demographics. Students are evenly distributed 
across kindergarten through fifth grades. The majority of elementary aged students are 
white, 33 percent are black, and 6 percent are Hispanic. Fifty-six percent of students 
receive lunch for free and 36 percent of students pay full price for school lunch. Only 
three percent of elementary school students did not receive a NSLP lunch at least once 
during the sample period. These students will be referred to as “Non-Participants” and 
should not be confused with students receiving a free NSLP lunch.  
On average, a participating student purchased 50 school lunches in the 66-day sample 
period. Histograms in Figure 2.1 show that the distribution of lunches purchased differs 
depending on lunch-price status, with the average free-lunch student purchasing 13 more 
lunches (about 1 more per week) than the paid-lunch students. The five most purchased 
entrees are the “Vegetarian Tray” (12.5 percent of sales), “Chicken Sandwich on Whole 
Grain Bun” (10.6 percent) “Chicken Nuggets with Dipping Sauce” (9.0 percent) “Cheese 
Pizza on a Whole Grain Crust” (7.4 percent), and “Hamburger on Whole Grain Bun” (6.6 
percent). However, these entrées are also offered more often than others, i.e. the 
“Vegetarian Tray” consists of a yogurt, cheese, and crackers and is available every day. 
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Given the number of days it is offered, the daily vegetarian option is actually one of the 
least popular entrees, averaging 528 transactions per day.  
Using the average number of purchases per day for the days that the item was offered, the 
most popular entrée is “Chicken Nuggets with Dipping Sauce” (3,144 entrees purchased 
per day offered). Moreover, if all breaded bite-size chicken-style entrée transactions are 
combined (including chicken nuggets, chicken chunks, and popcorn chicken; served with 
or without a whole grain roll), bite-size chicken is served 13 days (19 percent of days 
sampled) with an average of 4,178 purchases per day. A nationally representative 2004-
2005 study assessing school nutrition found 17 percent of daily menus offered some type 
of breaded/fried chicken product, so this district may offer this type of entrée slightly 
more than other school districts (Gordon et al. 2007a). Similarly, if all pizza-style entrée 
transactions are combined (including cheese pizza, pepperoni pizza, pizzatas, and stuffed 
crust dippers23), pizza-style entrees are served more than 30 percent of all days sampled, 
but only an average of 2,375 entrees are purchased per day when offered. The least 
popular entrees, measured by both percent of total sales and purchases per day offered are 
“Enchilada Pie with Whole Grain Roll” (0.12 percent of sales, 169 entrees purchased per 
day offered) and “Fish Nuggets with Dipping Sauce” (0.24 percent, 338 entrees per day). 
Table 4.3 provides the nutritional values for the five most purchased entrees and 
Appendix G contains nutritional values and popularity ranking for all entrée options 
                                                
23 Stuffed crust dippers are mozzarella cheese wrapped in pizza crust (Rich’s Food Service 2011a) and 
served with marinara sauce.  Pizzatas are mozzarella cheese, pepperoni, and marinara sauce wrapped in 
pizza crust (Rich’s Food Service 2011b). 
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offered during the sample period. On average, an entrée contains 340 calories, 15g fat, 
783mg sodium, 32g protein, and 19g carbohydrates. There are no federal mandates 
regarding the nutrition of an NSLP entrée, so without the nutritional information of the 
other food components offered, we are unable to determine whether or not the average 
lunch meets the guidelines. However, the guidelines do require that a NSLP lunch 
provide between 550 and 650 calories (averaged over the week), leaving little wiggle 
room for very energy dense entrees. Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of the total 
nutrients per entrée. More than half of the 37 entrees have between 233 and 320kcal. The 
entrée highest in calories is “Chicken Alfredo with a Whole Grain Bun” (579 calories) 
and was only served once in our sample period. The entrée lowest in calories is “Deli 
Sliced Turkey on a Whole Grain Bun” (146.5 calories) and was only served twice. “Deli 
Sliced Turkey on a Whole Grain Bun” is also the entrée lowest in fat (2.2 grams). The 
“Rib-B-Q on a Whole Grain Bun” has the highest amount of fat (25.5 grams). Average 
total sodium is greater than the 640mg cap effective 2014/15, and more than half the 
entrees have sodium levels greater than 640mg. Total sodium ranges from 345mg in 
“Italian Spaghetti” to 1,301mg in “Grilled Cheese with Chicken Noodle Soup.” 
According to the 2004-2005 School Nutrition Dietary Assessment (SNDA-III), entrees 
can contribute as much as 61 percent of the total protein in an NSLP elementary school 
lunch (Gordon et al. 2007).24 “Grilled Cheese” offers the least protein and “Chicken 
Alfredo with a Whole Grain Bun” offers the most protein. In this case, the entrée with the 
                                                
24 SNDA-III categorizes food groups differently than this paper.  Our “Entrée” includes the following 
SNDA-III major food groups: combination entrees, meat/meat Alternatives, and bread/grains. 
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most protein is also the entrée with the highest calories. When transactions are separated 
by lunch-price status, the average nutritional values remain similar. However, there are a 
few statistically significant but numerically small differences. For example, paid-status 
lunches have 0.04 fewer grams of fat than free-status lunches on average (see Table 4.2).  
Conditional Logit Results 
Table 4.4 provides odds-ratios for three conditional logit models. Odds-ratios can be 
interpreted as the proportional change in the odds of student i selecting entree j for a unit 
increase in the variable of interest, holding all other variables constant. All standard 
errors are clustered at PIN level.  
Model 1 
When limiting the sample to students purchasing lunch at school, increasing the calorie 
content of a specific entrée by one kilocalorie decreases the likelihood of a student 
selecting that entrée by a small but statistically significant amount. Contrarily, a one-
gram increase in the fat content of a specific entrée increases the likelihood of a student 
selecting that entrée. Positive and significant odds-ratios are also found for sodium and 
protein. The small magnitude of these results is not surprising, given the minute 
difference between, for example, a meal with 330kcal and one with 331kcal.  
Model 2 
Expanding the choice set to include lunch from home as a fourth alternative increases the 
number of observations by 362,604 to account for 90,651 observations in which students 
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are assumed to bring a lunch from instead of one of the three entrees served at school.25 
Including these additional students does not change the signs or the magnitudes of the 
odds-ratios. The coefficient of the indicator variable Home is statistically significant. 
Assuming all lunches from home have the nutritionals of an average school entree, 
students are 16 percent less likely to choose that alternative instead of purchasing a lunch 
at school.  
Model 3 
The final model includes interactions between income-eligibility status and Calories, Fat, 
Sodium, Protein, and Carbohydrates. Free lunch status acts as the base category and thus 
the odds-ratios of the nutritionals without interactions represent the effect on the 
probability of choosing entrée j for students purchasing a free lunch. We find that 
income-eligibility does impact the probability of selecting a specific entrée. Relative to 
students receiving a free lunch, an increase in Fat and Carbohydrates decrease the 
likelihood of a paid-price lunch student selecting that entrée by a statistically significant 
amount. Relative to students receiving a free lunch, increases in Protein increase the 
likelihood of a paid-price lunch student selecting that entrée. No statistically significant 
differences across income were found for sodium. Lastly, an increase in Calories 
decreases the likelihood of a reduced-price lunch student selected that entrée relative to 
free-lunch students. For Fat, Sodium, Protein, and Carbohydrates, no statistically 
                                                
25 362,604 additional observations/4 choices per student = 90,651 additional students. 
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significant differences between reduced-price and free-lunch students are found, 
suggesting these students respond similarly to changes in entrée nutritionals.  
OLS Regression Results 
It is important to remember that the data provide information on the entrée choice a 
student makes and the corresponding nutritional values. Recall that the dependent 
variables, Yi, do not measure the nutrients consumed, only the nutrients purchased. For 
example, a positive coefficient on Gender would suggest that boys are systematically 
choosing entrees that are more energy dense (when Yi = Calories) than girls. We would 
not know if boys are simultaneously choosing side items with fewer calories, or if girls 
are choosing more energy dense entrees and do not eat it all. 
Calories 
Race, Status, and Gender are not statistically significant (Table 4.5). Grade, our proxy for 
age, is significant. Relative to kindergartners, students in second to fifth grade choose 
entrees with more calories. Joint F-tests for Status and Race fail to reject the null 
hypothesis: neither income-eligibility status nor race influence the caloric content of a 
student’s choice of entrée (Table 4.6).     
Fat 
The results for estimates pertaining to Fat are similar to the results pertaining to Calories. 
Black students purchase entrees with more fat than white students, but the resulting 
difference is negligible. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference across all 
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Race groups is rejected in favor of the alternative; similar results are found with Grade. 
Like the Calories model, the R2 is very small: less than one-hundredth of a percent of 
variation in Fat can be explained by the explanatory variables. The coefficient for 
income-ineligible students (Paid Status) is significant and positive, suggesting that 
students purchasing a paid-lunch choose entrees with more fat than students purchasing 
free lunch. The joint F tests conclude that all four groups of explanatory variables 
contribute to the total fat grams a student selects. 
Sodium 
Compared to white students, black students all choose higher sodium entrees than white 
students. Students receiving free lunch (Free Status) choose entrees with less salt than 
students purchasing full-price lunches. The coefficient on Gender was also statistically 
significant: male students chose lower sodium entrees than female students.  
As in the model where Fat is the dependent variable, as students get older, they choose 
entrees with greater amounts of sodium. Second graders choose entrees with 24.41mg 
more than kindergartners while fifth graders choose entrees with 45.9mg more sodium 
than kindergartners. The joint F tests conclude that all four groups of explanatory 
variables contribute to the total sodium a student is served.  
Protein 
When controlling for income, gender, age, and race, black students choose entrees with 
0.24 more grams of protein than white students (the amount of protein in three baby 
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carrots (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2011b)). The coefficients for Other Race and 
Gender are also statistically significant, but very small in magnitude (0.06 and 0.07g, 
respectively). Income-ineligible students choose entrees with 0.11g more protein than 
income-eligible students purchasing a free lunch. Similarly to the model for sodium, 
older students choose entrees with statistically larger amounts of protein.  
Carbohydrates 
In the final nutrient analysis, the joint F-tests suggest that Race, Status, Gender, Grade, 
and school contribute to the total carbohydrates a student is served. The coefficient for 
Black (compared to White) is negative and statistically significant but small in magnitude. 
We also find male students choose entrees with 0.14 fewer carbohydrates than female 
students. Additionally, younger students prefer entrees with more carbohydrates than 
older students.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between income-eligibility status (Free, 
Reduced, or Paid) and entrée selection. Using a unique dataset tracking daily entrée 
choices and their nutritional value among elementary students at a suburban school 
district, this paper provides a novel approach to understanding the healthfulness of the 
NSLP. Without controlling for age, gender, or race, OLS regression results conclude 
there is no difference in the caloric content of entrees selected by students purchasing 
free, reduced-price, or paid lunches. Conversely, students purchasing paid-lunches 
choose entrees with less fat and sodium than students purchasing free lunches. When 
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controlling for age, gender, and race, students that receive a free lunch choose entrees 
with less sodium than students purchasing either reduced-price or paid lunches. Relative 
to students receiving free lunches, students purchasing paid lunches also choose entrees 
with more protein and fat.  
Results from the conditional logit models conclude that while all students are more likely 
to select entrees with more fat, sodium, and protein, students purchasing free lunches are 
more likely than students purchasing paid-price lunches to select entrees with more fat 
and carbohydrates. In addition, students purchasing free lunch are less likely to select 
entrees with more protein than students purchasing paid-price lunches. While the new 
NSLP guidelines aim to reduce the fat and sodium content of all school lunches offered, 
students prefer these qualities in their foods. Implementing a school-wide nutritional 
education curriculum may improve the nutritional content actually consumed.  
The data are collected five months after implementation of new guidelines. Although we 
do not collect data prior to implementation, it is likely that guidelines requiring each 
qualifying lunch to have an average of 550 to 650 calories led to the narrow distribution 
of calories among the 37 entrees offered at the elementary schools. The new guidelines 
also require sodium levels to be less than 650mg per meal, but this will not be effective 
until the 2014/15 school year. Future research may compare the distribution of sodium 
among entrees before and after the guideline come into effect. Lastly, POS data is limited 
to analysis of purchases, not consumption. The data do not allow the researchers to see if 
differences in entrée selections result in differences in entrée consumption patterns across 
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income. Future research could examine the relationship between consumption and 




Table 4.1. Student Demographics 
    Status 
 
 All 









Gender (Percent)           
    Female  48.6  48.1  50.0  49.3  47.6 
     Male  51.4  52.0  50.0  50.7  52.4 
           
Race (Percent)           




































           
Grade (Percent)           
     Kindergarten  17.4  19.2  16.3  15.4  11.2 
     First  18.3  18.7  17.0  17.7  18.7 
     Second  16.2  16.9  14.2  15.9  10.7 
     Third  16.1  15.3  16.3  17.5  13.9 
     Fourth  15.5  14.5  17.0  16.7  16.6 
     Fifth  16.5  15.4  19.2  16.8  28.9 
           
Status (Percent)           
     Free  56.3  100.0  0  0  0 
     Reduced  4.9  0  100.0  0  0 
     Paid  35.6  0  0  100.0  0 
     Non-Buyer  3.2  0  0  0  100.0 
           
No. Meals Purchased  50.0  55.0  53.3  41.7  0 
  (15.9)  (10.0)  (12.2)  (20.0)   
           
Total Students  5,779  3,252  282  2,058  187 
Notes: “Other” includes students of Asian, Indian, Pacific Islander, or mixed race. Standard deviation listed 




Table 4.2. Food Energy and Nutrients  
        Mean By Status 
 x All Transactions x Free      x Reduced x Paid 
Food Energy  Mean  Min  Max       
     Calories (kCal)  334.47  146.50  579.00  334.56  333.90  334.38 
  (50.54)      (50.74)  (50.60)  (50.13) 
             
Nutrients             
     Fat (g)  15.37  2.25  25.50  15.38  15.41  15.34* 
  (4.75)      (4.77)  (4.77)  (4.71) 
             
     Sodium (mg)  722.30  345.00  1,301.00  721.80  727.11***  722.52†† 
  (242.24)      (242.03)  (240.39)  (242.99) 
             
     Protein (g)  18.52  11.00  34.50  18.50  18.51  18.55*** 
  (3.83)      (3.82)  (3.82)  (3.84) 
             
     Carbohydrates (g)  29.93  17.50  59.00  29.94  29.84*  29.91 
  (7.33)      (7.35)  (7.29)  (7.31) 
             
Total Transactions  279,698  178,865  15,023  85,810 
Notes: Standard deviation listed in parentheses. Means statistically different than Free Status at the .1, .05, 
and .01 level denoted with *, **, and *** respectively. Differences between Reduced and Paid Status are 
denoted with †, ††, and †††.   
 
 














Entree         
     Vegetarian Tray  12.46  325.0 12.5 395.0 14.0 37.5 
         
     Chicken Sandwich  10.58  316.5 11.5 727.5 19.5 36.0 
         
     Chicken Nuggets  8.99  326.0 12.0 656.0 15.0 19.0 
         
     Cheese Pizza  7.35  310.0 12.0 490.0 21.0 31.0 
         
     Hamburger  6.57  291.5 12.0 509.5 22.5 23.0 
Notes: Vegetarian Tray is served each day and includes yogurt, cheese, and cracker. Chicken Nuggets are 
served with honey mustard dipping sauce. Chicken Sandwich is served on a whole grain bun. Hamburger 











Lunch from Homex 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Choose Lunch From Home -  0.842***  0.842*** 
 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
      Calories 0.998***  0.999***  0.999*** 
 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
      Fat 1.058***  1.054***  1.055*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
      Sodium 1.0002***  1.0003***  1.0003*** 
 
(0.00002)  (0.00001)  (0.00002) 
      Protein 1.063***  1.056***  1.054*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
      Carbohydrates 0.964***  0.958***  0.959*** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0007)  (0.001) 
Calories x Status      










Fat x Status     










Sodium x Status     










Protein x Status     





















Lunch from Homex 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Carbohydrates x Status      










      Number of Observations 1,113,684  1,476,288  1,476,288 
      Log-Likelihood -362,255  -477,529  -477,505 
Notes: Odd-ratios are presented. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at PIN level. *, **, 




Table 4.5. OLS Regression Results 
 












Race (White Omitted)          
     Black 0.22  0.07**  15.47***  0.24***  -0.30*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.03)  (2.14)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
 
         
     Hispanic -0.20  -0.01  -3.01  0.02  0.02 
 
(0.39)  (0.05)  (3.89)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
 
         
     Other -0.31  -0.06  5.59  0.06  -0.02 
 
(0.37)  (0.04)  (3.43)  (0.05)  (0.08) 
Status (Free Omitted)          
     Reduced -0.41  0.05  6.81  0.03  -0.12 
 
(0.40)  (0.05)  (3.63)  (0.05)  (0.08) 
 
         
     Paid 0.40  0.07*  7.58***  0.11***  -0.10 
 
(0.24)  (0.03)  (2.21)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Gender (Female Omitted)          
     Male -0.17  -0.02  -3.44*  0.07**  -0.14*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.02)  (1.65)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Grade (Kindergarten Omitted)          
     First -0.44  0.21***  5.62  -0.03  -0.39*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.04)  (3.15)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
 
         
     Second 0.72*  0.34***  24.41***  0.15***  -0.59*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.04)  (3.21)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
 
         
     Third 0.78*  0.36***  34.23***  0.30***  -0.71*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.04)  (3.17)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
 
         
     Fourth 0.94**  0.36***  39.47***  0.43***  -0.85*** 
 
(0.33)  (0.04)  (3.16)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
 
         
     Fifth 1.09***  0.45***  45.88***  0.47***  -0.94*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.04)  (3.10)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
School (School 11 Omitted)          
     School 1 4.47***  0.46***  35.34***  0.45***  -0.40*** 
 
(0.44)  (0.05)  (3.79)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
 
         
     School 2 3.31***  0.25***  17.48***  0.18**  0.13 
 





Table 4.5 (continued). OLS Regression Results 
 












School (continued)          
     School 3 2.69***  0.08  12.95***  0.22***  -0.04 
 
(0.41)  (0.05)  (3.90)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
 
         
     School 4 4.05***  0.30***  16.88***  0.20**  0.07 
 
(0.46)  (0.05)  (4.38)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
 
         
     School 5 1.02*  -0.03  12.80***  0.32***  -0.09 
 
(0.40)  (0.05)  (3.81)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
 
         
     School 6 0.65  -0.35***  13.56***  0.76***  -0.33*** 
 
(0.42)  (0.05)  (3.57)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
 
         
     School 7 4.18***  -0.06  29.26***  0.80***  0.01 
 
(0.43)  (0.05)  (3.59)  (0.05)  (0.08) 
 
         
     School 8 2.85***  0.01  15.74***  0.41***  0.14 
 
(0.45)  (0.05)  (4.09)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
 
         
     School 9 0.07  -0.00  4.37  -0.18*  0.09 
 
(0.55)  (0.07)  (5.97)  (0.08)  (0.14) 
 
         
    School 10 1.40**  0.31***  29.90***  0.36***  -0.68*** 
 
(0.47)  (0.05)  (4.17)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
 
         
Constant 331.57***  14.96***  673.71***  17.79***  30.82*** 
 
(0.41)  (0.05)  (4.15)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
 
         
R- Squared 0.0010  0.0032  0.0084  0.0089  0.0039 
F-Test 15.28  33.11  33.14  44.08  24.73 
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: “Other” includes students of Asian, Indian, Pacific Islander, or mixed race. Robust standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at PIN level. *, **, *** indicate significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, 
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Note: F jointly tests the hypothesis that coefficients for each indicator variable (Race, Status, Grade, 






Figure 4.1. Total Number of Lunches Purchased per Student 
 
 


















Appendix A. National School Lunch Program Weekly Meal Pattern 
Table A.1. Weekly Meal Pattern for Kindergarten to Fifth Grade 
  Required Amount 
  Weekly  Daily 
     
Fruits (cups)  2.5  0.5 
Vegetables (cups)  3.75  0.75 
     Dark Greena  0.5  - 
     Red/Orangeb  0.75  - 
     Legumesc  0.5  - 
     Starchyd  0.5  - 
     Othere  0.5  - 
     Additional Veg. to Reach Total  1  - 
Grain/Bread (oz eq)  8 to 9  1 
Meat/Meat Alternatives (oz eq)  8 to 10  1 
Milk (cups)  5  1 
Calories (kcal)    Must average 550 to 650 
Saturated Fat (% kcal from sat. fat)    ≤ 10 
Sodium (mg)    Must average ≤ 640 
Notes: a Dark green vegetables include bok choy, broccoli, collards, dark green leafy lettuce, kale, mesclun, 
mustard greens, romaine, spinach, and turnip. b Red/orange vegetables include acorn squash, butternut 
squash, carrots, pumpkin, tomatoes, and sweet potatoes. c Legumes include black beans, dry black-eyed 
peas, chick-peas, kidney, lentil, navy beans, soy beans, split peas, and white beans. d Starchy vegetables 
include non-dry black eyed peas, corn, cassava, green banana, green peas, green lima beans, plantains, taro, 
water chestnut, white potatoes. e Other vegetables include all other fresh, frozen, canned veggies cooked or 
raw, such as artichokes, asparagus, avocado, bean sprouts, beets, brussel sprouts, cabbage, cauliflower, 
celery, cucumber, eggplant, green beans, green peppers, iceberg lettuce, mushrooms, okra, onion, parsnips, 
turnips, wax beans, and zucchini. Requirements are for meals as offered for a 5-day school week. These 
represent minimum portion sizes. Milk can be flavored skim milk or unflavored 1% or skim milk. 
Beginning in SY 2012/13, 50 percent of all grains must be whole grain rich; effective SY 2014/15 all grains 





Appendix B. State Policies 
Table B.1. State Nutrition Policies By Region 
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to Vending  
Machines   
South          
  Alabama Rec  None  None  Yes  Require 
  Arkansas Rec  None  None  Yes  Require 
  Florida None  None  None  Yes  None 
  Georgia Rec  Rec  Rec  Yes  Require 
  Kentucky None  None  None  Yes  Require 
  Louisiana Rec  Rec  None  No  Require 
  Maryland None  None  None  No  Rec 
  Mississippi Rec  None  Rec  Yes  None 
  Delaware Rec  None  Rec  Yes  None 
  Dist. of Columbia None  None  None  Yes  Require 
  North Carolina Rec  Rec  Rec  No  Rec 
  Oklahoma None  None  None  No  None 
  South Carolina Require  Require  Rec  No  Rec 
  Tennessee Rec  Rec  Rec  Yes  Require 
  Texas Rec  None  None  No  None 
  Virginia Rec  Rec  Rec  No  None 
  West Virginia Rec  Rec  Rec  Yes  Require 
West          
  Alaska None  None  None  No  None 
  Arizona None  Require  Require  Yes  None 
  California None  None  None  No  None 
  Colorado None  None  None  No  Require 
  Hawaii None  None  None  Yes  Rec 
  Idaho Rec  Rec  Rec  No  None 
  Montana Rec  Rec  Rec  No  None 
  Nevada Rec  None  None  Yes  None 
  New Mexico Require  Rec  Require  No  Require 
  Oregon Rec  Rec  Rec  No  Rec 




Table B.1 (continued). State Nutrition Policies By Region 
 
(1) 




















to Vending  
Machines   
West (continued)          
  Washington None  None  None  No  Require 
  Wyoming None  Rec  None  No  Rec 
North          
  Connecticut Rec  Rec  Rec  No  Rec 
  Maine None  None  None  No  None 
  Massachusetts Rec  Rec  Rec  No  Rec 
  New Hampshire None  None  None  No  None 
  New Jersey None  None  None  No  Require 
  New York Require  Rec  Rec  Yes  Require 
  Pennsylvania Rec  Rec  Rec  No  None 
  Rhode Island None  None  None  Yes  Require 
  Vermont Rec  Rec  Rec  Yes  Require 
Midwest          
  Illinois None  None  None  No  None 
  Indiana None  None  None  No  None 
  Iowa None  Rec  Rec  No  Rec 
  Kansas Rec  Rec  Rec  Yes  Require 
  Michigan None  None  None  No  Require 
  Minnesota None  None  None  Yes  Require 
  Missouri Rec  Rec  Rec  Yes  Rec 
  Nebraska None  None  None  No  Rec 
  North Dakota Rec  Rec  Rec  No  None 
  Ohio Rec  None  None  No  None 
  South Dakota Rec  None  None  No  None 
  Wisconsin None  None  None  No  None 
Notes: Recommended is abbreviated “Rec.”  A food service representative from each state was asked the 
following questions regarding health and nutrition policies. (1) Does the state require or recommend that 
schools offer students a choice between 2 or more different lunch entrées daily? (2) Does the state require 
or recommend that schools offer students a choice between 2 or more different vegetables daily? (3) Does 
the state require or recommend that schools offer students a choice between 2 or more different fruits daily? 
(4) Has your state adopted a policy stating that each district will have someone to oversee or coordinate 
food service in the district, such as a district food service director? (5) Does your state require or 
recommend that elementary schools prohibit student access to vending machines for at least part of the 
school day? (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2007)  
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Appendix C. Results for Vegetable Subgroups 




































































































Race (White Omitted) 































































Urbanicity (Urban Omitted) 































































Region (North Omitted) 















































































































































           Month (Month1 Omitted) 










































































Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  




Table C.2. Model 2, Vegetable Subgroups 























































Race (White Omitted) 































































Urbanicity (Urban Omitted) 
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Table C.2 (continued). Model 2, Vegetable Subgroups 












xx Green x Red/Orange x Legumes x Starchy x Other 
Month (Month1 Omitted) 































































































Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, 



















x Green x Red/Orange x Legumes x Starchy x Other 
Income Dummy (<=3.5 Omitted) 









































































































Race (White Omitted) 































































Urbanicity (Urban Omitted) 































































Region (North Omitted) 
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Month (Month1 Omitted) 































































































Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  





Table C.4. Model 4, Vegetable Subgroups 























































Race (White Omitted) 































































Urbanicity (Urban Omitted) 































































Region (North Omitted) 
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Table C.4 (continued). Model 4, Vegetable Subgroups 












xx Green x Red/Orange x Legumes x Starchy x Other 
Month (Month1 Omitted) 































































































Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  





Table C.5. Model 5, Vegetable Subgroups 












x Green x Red/Orange x Legumes x Starchy x Other 
Eligible Dummy  
( <= 0.20 Omitted) 









































































































Race (White Omitted) 































































Urbanicity (Urban Omitted) 































































Region (North Omitted) 


































































Table C.5 (continued). Model 5, Vegetable Subgroups 























































Month (Month1 Omitted) 































































































Notes: The number of observations for each regression is 816.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  





Figure C.1. Marginal Effects of Median County Income on Number 




Figure C.2. Marginal Effects of Median County Income on Number 





Figure C.3. Marginal Effects of Median County Income on Number 




Figure C.4. Marginal Effects of Median County Income on Number 





Figure C.5. Marginal Effects of Median County Income on Number 
of Other Vegetables Offered Weekly 
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Appendix D.  Additional Income Specifications 
Table D.1. Additional Income Specifications, Total Entrees and Total Fruit 





LnIncome -107.588 - - - 
 
2.705 - - - 
 
(66.906) 
    
(36.909) 
             LnIncome2 5.181 - - - 
 
-0.023 - - - 
 
(3.100) 
    
(1.704) 
             Income - 0.999** -0.861 -0.950 x - 0.385 0.793 -2.811 
  
(0.308) (1.142) (11.091) 
  
(0.196) (0.665) (6.869) 
          Income2 - - 0.154 0.772 
 
- - -0.034 0.941 
   
(0.095) (2.716) 
   
(0.050) (1.643) 
          Income3 - - - -0.127 
 
- - - -0.110 
    
(0.279) 
    
(0.166) 
          Income4 - - - 0.007 
 
- - - 0.004 
    
(0.010) 
    
(0.006) 
          Attained BA 2.235 1.705 2.396 2.075 
 
-3.309 -3.137 -3.298 -3.365 
 
(3.561) (3.564) (3.559) (3.574) 
 
(2.432) (2.386) (2.436) (2.442) 
Race (White Omitted) 
              Black -2.508* -2.264 -2.535* -2.256 
 
0.316 0.236 0.294 0.301 
 
(1.187) (1.169) (1.166) (1.202) 
 
(0.769) (0.748) (0.762) (0.767) 
               Hispanic -0.773 -0.720 -0.755 -0.737 
 
-0.869 -0.890 -0.875 -0.894 
 
(1.440) (1.434) (1.436) (1.453) 
 
(0.703) (0.701) (0.702) (0.706) 
              Other -1.815 -1.408 -2.015 -1.472 
 
-1.542 -1.713 -1.571 -1.533 
 
(2.592) (2.499) (2.572) (2.543) 
 




Table D.1 (continued). Additional Income Specifications, Total Entrees and Total Fruit 





Urbanicity (Urban Omitted) 
             Suburban 0.328 0.364 0.301 0.326 
 
0.872* 0.856* 0.870* 0.867* 
 
(0.625) (0.620) (0.623) (0.625) 
 
(0.420) (0.420) (0.421) (0.421) 
          
     Rural -0.959 -0.913 -0.971 -0.916 
 
0.565 0.548 0.559 0.554 
 
(0.804) (0.796) (0.798) (0.806) 
 
(0.580) (0.576) (0.577) (0.582) 
          ln(Enrollment) 1.121*** 1.089*** 1.130*** 1.089*** 
 
0.546*** 0.558*** 0.549*** 0.545*** 
 
(0.186) (0.184) (0.186) (0.185) 
 
(0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) 
Region (North Omitted) 
              Midwest -4.407*** -4.423*** -4.457*** -4.652*** -0.374 -0.376 -0.363 -0.388 
 
(0.892) (0.892) (0.882) (0.884) 
 
(0.525) (0.522) (0.524) (0.542) 
              South -4.575*** -4.473*** -4.714*** -4.754*** -0.422 -0.478 -0.416 -0.419 
 
(1.001) (1.006) (0.996) (0.993) 
 
(0.656) (0.663) (0.660) (0.665) 
              West -5.555*** -5.563*** -5.565*** -5.703*** -1.065* -1.062* -1.060* -1.087* 
 
(0.980) (0.979) (0.977) (0.981) 
 
(0.523) (0.521) (0.521) (0.530) 
          Vending -1.054 -1.029 -1.076* -1.088* 
 
-0.191 -0.202 -0.190 -0.193 
 
(0.539) (0.542) (0.539) (0.540) 
 
(0.300) (0.300) (0.301) (0.301) 
          Coordinator 1.830* 1.854* 1.839* 1.822* 
 
0.533 0.529 0.530 0.514 
 
(0.742) (0.743) (0.741) (0.740) 
 
(0.485) (0.484) (0.485) (0.482) 
          Food Policy 0.390 0.415 0.371 0.364 
 
0.371 0.354 0.373 0.367 
 
(0.536) (0.539) (0.534) (0.538) 
 
(0.276) (0.274) (0.276) (0.276) 
          
continued… 
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Table D.1 (continued). Additional Income Specifications, Total Entrees and Total Fruit 





Month (Month1 Omitted) 
              Month2 1.179 1.186 1.168 1.178 
 
-1.352* -1.355* -1.352* -1.350* 
 
(0.861) (0.859) (0.860) (0.856) 
 
(0.615) (0.616) (0.615) (0.616) 
              Month3 1.426 1.443 1.399 1.390 
 
-1.039 -1.048 -1.039 -1.039 
 
(0.745) (0.743) (0.744) (0.738) 
 
(0.563) (0.565) (0.563) (0.563) 
          Constant 562.098 -0.016 4.968 2.179 
 
-22.363 2.140 1.044 5.811 
 
(360.977) (2.332) (3.525) (16.665) 
 
(199.856) (1.344) (2.065) (10.326) 
          R2 0.206 0.206 0.209 0.213 
 
0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 




Table D.2. Additional Specifications, Total Vegetables and Green Vegetables 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 





LnIncome -38.918 - - - 
 
-11.752 - - - 
 
(44.006) 
    
(11.942) 
             LnIncome2 1.849 - - - 
 
0.570 - - - 
 
(2.028) 
    
(0.551) 
             Income - 0.263 -0.464 5.918 x - 0.126* -0.071 1.678 
  
(0.216) (0.838) (8.396) 
  
(0.051) (0.202) (2.273) 
          Income2 - - 0.060 -1.359 
 
- - 0.016 -0.356 
   
(0.066) (2.060) 
   
(0.017) (0.554) 
          Income3 - - - 0.130 
 
- - - 0.032 
    
(0.212) 
    
(0.057) 
          Income4 - - - -0.004 
 
- - - -0.001 
    
(0.008) 
    
(0.002) 
          Attained BA -0.512 -0.732 -0.455 -0.486 
 
-0.737 -0.791 -0.716 -0.733 
 
(2.911) (2.832) (2.906) (2.930) 
 
(0.629) (0.620) (0.629) (0.632) 
Race (White Omitted) 
              Black -2.676** -2.571** -2.676*** -2.543** 
 
0.634* 0.658* 0.629* 0.674* 
 
(0.811) (0.784) (0.802) (0.810) 
 
(0.266) (0.260) (0.264) (0.268) 
              Hispanic -1.407 -1.382 -1.406 -1.377 
 
-0.132 -0.126 -0.133 -0.125 
 
(0.758) (0.755) (0.756) (0.760) 
 
(0.220) (0.218) (0.219) (0.218) 
              Other -4.344** -4.157** -4.405** -4.211** 
 
-0.758* -0.720* -0.787* -0.719* 
 
(1.473) (1.421) (1.462) (1.452) 
 
(0.365) (0.346) (0.358) (0.362) 
          
continued… 
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Table D.2 (continued). Additional Specifications, Total Vegetables and Green Vegetables 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 





Urbanicity (Urban Omitted)          
     Suburban 0.036 0.053 0.028 0.045 
 
0.102 0.105 0.098 0.103 
 
(0.427) (0.426) (0.427) (0.426) 
 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) 
          
     Rural 0.826 0.846 0.826 0.866 
 
-0.052 -0.048 -0.053 -0.041 
 
(0.601) (0.590) (0.596) (0.598) 
 
(0.147) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) 
ln(Enrollment) 0.542*** 0.528*** 0.545*** 0.530*** 
 
0.086* 0.083* 0.088* 0.083* 
 
(0.134) (0.137) (0.135) (0.134) 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Region (North Omitted) 
              Midwest 0.781 0.775 0.753 0.684 
 
0.301* 0.299* 0.293* 0.268 
 
(0.501) (0.503) (0.509) (0.513) 
 
(0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.150) 
              South 2.259** 2.310*** 2.202** 2.167** 
 
0.226 0.236 0.207 0.195 
 
(0.687) (0.687) (0.695) (0.703) 
 
(0.168) (0.168) (0.170) (0.171) 
              West -0.568 -0.573 -0.577 -0.607 
 
-0.173 -0.173 -0.175 -0.187 
 
(0.535) (0.535) (0.536) (0.543) 
 
(0.153) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) 
          Vending -0.524 -0.512 -0.531 -0.529 
 
-0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 
 
(0.355) (0.354) (0.355) (0.354) 
 
(0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
          Coordinator -0.276 -0.266 -0.268 -0.241 
 
0.038 0.040 0.040 0.047 
 
(0.581) (0.581) (0.580) (0.584) 
 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) 
          Vegetable Policy 0.798* 0.808* 0.778* 0.755* 
 
0.146 0.148 0.140 0.132 
 
(0.331) (0.330) (0.333) (0.335) 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
                    
continued… 
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Table D.2 (continued). Additional Specifications, Total Vegetables and Green Vegetables 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 





Month (Month1 Omitted) 
              Month2 -0.529 -0.526 -0.531 -0.528 
 
-0.116 -0.116 -0.117 -0.116 
 
(0.589) (0.589) (0.589) (0.588) 
 
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
              Month3 -0.347 -0.340 -0.355 -0.357 
 
-0.153 -0.152 -0.156 -0.157 
 
(0.531) (0.530) (0.531) (0.532) 
 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) 
          Constant 210.421 4.646** 6.600* -3.325 
 
60.767 -0.221 0.307 -2.493 
 
(238.995) (1.471) (2.788) (12.219) 
 
(64.691) (0.402) (0.697) (3.303) 
          R2 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.087 
 
0.082 0.082 0.083 0.085 





Table D.3. Additional Specifications, Red/Orange Vegetables and Legumes 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20) 
 





LnIncome -10.177 - - - 
 
0.453 - - - 
 
(15.376) 
    
(8.804) 
             LnIncome2 0.488 - - - 
 
-0.006 - - - 
 
(0.712) 
    
(0.404) 
             Income - 0.084 0.000 1.652 x - 0.057 0.038 3.298* 
  
(0.069) (0.266) (3.093) 
  
(0.049) (0.192) (1.660) 
          Income2 - - 0.007 -0.415 
 
- - 0.002 -0.764 
   
(0.023) (0.756) 
   
(0.015) (0.414) 
          Income3 - - - 0.045 
 
- - - 0.075 
    
(0.077) 
    
(0.043) 
          Income4 - - - -0.002 
 
- - - -0.003 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.002) 
          Attained BA -0.795 -0.827 -0.795 -0.775 
 
-1.249 -1.241 -1.233 -1.229 
 
(0.877) (0.876) (0.876) (0.877) 
 
(0.714) (0.685) (0.712) (0.723) 
Race (White Omitted) 
              Black -0.746** -0.723** -0.735** -0.726** 
 
-0.269 -0.280 -0.283 -0.234 
 
(0.273) (0.268) (0.271) (0.274) 
 
(0.160) (0.155) (0.159) (0.159) 
              Hispanic 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.017 
 
-0.144 -0.147 -0.147 -0.132 
 
(0.262) (0.261) (0.262) (0.262) 
 
(0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.159) 
              Other -0.206 -0.162 -0.190 -0.188 
 
-0.261 -0.287 -0.293 -0.230 
 
(0.621) (0.602) (0.619) (0.618) 
 
(0.397) (0.392) (0.397) (0.386) 
        
continued… 
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Table D.3 (continued). Additional Specifications, Red/Orange Vegetables and Legumes 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20) 
 





Urbanicity (Urban Omitted)          
     Suburban 0.134 0.139 0.136 0.138 
 
-0.060 -0.063 -0.064 -0.057 
 
(0.150) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) 
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
          
     Rural -0.026 -0.020 -0.023 -0.018 
 
-0.065 -0.069 -0.070 -0.053 
 
(0.181) (0.179) (0.180) (0.181) 
 
(0.141) (0.138) (0.140) (0.139) 
ln(Enrollment) 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 
0.023 0.025 0.025 0.020 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Region (North Omitted) 
              Midwest 0.101 0.098 0.096 0.098 
 
0.055 0.057 0.056 0.035 
 
(0.173) (0.172) (0.174) (0.176) 
 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.113) 
              South 0.213 0.223 0.210 0.208 
 
0.436** 0.429** 0.427** 0.413** 
 
(0.226) (0.225) (0.229) (0.231) 
 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.138) (0.140) 
              West -0.444* -0.446* -0.447* -0.441* 
 
-0.197* -0.195* -0.195* -0.201* 
 
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) 
 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) 
          Vending -0.153 -0.151 -0.153 -0.152 
 
-0.123 -0.124 -0.125 -0.123 
 
(0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) 
 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
          Coordinator -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 
 
0.025 0.025 0.025 0.039 
 
(0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 
 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.124) 
          Vegetable Policy 0.094 0.096 0.092 0.091 
 
0.097 0.095 0.094 0.086 
 
(0.106) (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) 
        
continued… 
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Table D.3 (continued). Additional Specifications, Red/Orange Vegetables and Legumes 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20) 
 





Month (Month1 Omitted) 
              Month2 -0.147 -0.146 -0.146 -0.147 
 
-0.206 -0.207 -0.207 -0.207 
 
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
              Month3 -0.208 -0.207 -0.208 -0.208 
 
-0.118 -0.119 -0.119 -0.120 
 
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
          Constant 53.827 0.450 0.674 -1.627 
 
-2.845 1.026** 1.079 -3.795 
 
(83.085) (0.507) (0.893) (4.522) 
 
(47.970) (0.324) (0.631) (2.339) 
          R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 
 
0.058 0.058 0.058 0.060 





Table D.4. Additional Specifications, Starchy Vegetables and Other Vegetables  
 
(29) (30) (31) (32) 
 





LnIncome -15.805 - - - 
 
-11.565 - - - 
 
(11.415) 
    
(13.313) 
             LnIncome2 0.741 - - - 
 
0.543 - - - 
 
(0.524) 
    
(0.616) 
             Income - 0.066 -0.163 1.403 x - 0.055 -0.167 4.481* 
  
(0.052) (0.215) (2.212) 
  
(0.059) (0.240) (2.226) 
          Income2 - - 0.019 -0.394 
 
- - 0.018 -1.139* 
   
(0.017) (0.527) 
   
(0.020) (0.545) 
          Income3 - - - 0.046 
 
- - - 0.121* 
    
(0.053) 
    
(0.056) 
          Income4 - - - -0.002 
 
- - - -0.004* 
    
(0.002) 
    
(0.002) 
          Attained BA -1.343 -1.430* -1.343 -1.318 
 
0.468 0.393 0.477 0.518 
 
(0.740) (0.725) (0.739) (0.743) 
 
(0.729) (0.738) (0.730) (0.728) 
Race (White Omitted) 
              Black -0.391 -0.342 -0.376 -0.373 
 
-0.222 -0.186 -0.218 -0.180 
 
(0.265) (0.257) (0.261) (0.267) 
 
(0.291) (0.281) (0.290) (0.288) 
              Hispanic -0.528* -0.516* -0.524* -0.517* 
 
0.029 0.038 0.030 0.051 
 
(0.215) (0.212) (0.213) (0.216) 
 
(0.258) (0.255) (0.256) (0.256) 
              Other -1.452** -1.360** -1.438** -1.447** 
 
-1.207** -1.143** -1.219** -1.185** 
 
(0.446) (0.437) (0.441) (0.447) 
 
(0.413) (0.397) (0.405) (0.413) 
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Table D.4 (continued). Additional Specifications, Starchy Vegetables and Other Vegetables  
 
(29) (30) (31) (32) 
 





Urbanicity (Urban Omitted)          
     Suburban -0.094 -0.085 -0.093 -0.091 
 
0.170 0.176 0.168 0.176 
 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) 
          
     Rural 0.210 0.221 0.215 0.218 
 
0.302 0.308 0.302 0.319 
 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) 
 
(0.166) (0.164) (0.165) (0.166) 
          ln(Enrollment) 0.027 0.021 0.026 0.027 
 
0.080 0.075 0.080 0.078 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Region (North Omitted) 
              Midwest 0.411** 0.408** 0.401** 0.407** 
 
0.371* 0.370* 0.363* 0.357* 
 
(0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.147) 
 
(0.151) (0.150) (0.152) (0.156) 
              South 0.669*** 0.693*** 0.659*** 0.658*** 
 
0.662** 0.681** 0.647** 0.636** 
 
(0.167) (0.166) (0.168) (0.169) 
 
(0.229) (0.227) (0.231) (0.234) 
              West -0.235 -0.238 -0.239 -0.230 
 
-0.098 -0.099 -0.101 -0.091 
 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) 
 
(0.173) (0.172) (0.173) (0.175) 
          Vending -0.116 -0.110 -0.116 -0.115 
 
-0.210* -0.205* -0.211* -0.208* 
 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) 
          Coordinator 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.021 
 
-0.182 -0.179 -0.180 -0.158 
 
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.158) (0.159) 
          Vegetable Policy 0.177 0.182 0.172 0.172 
 
0.071 0.075 0.065 0.058 
 
(0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) 
 
(0.090) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) 
          
continued… 
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Table D.4 (continued). Additional Specifications, Starchy Vegetables and Other Vegetables  
 
(29) (30) (31) (32) 
 





Month (Month1 Omitted) 
              Month2 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 
-0.083 -0.082 -0.083 -0.084 
 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
 
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) 
              Month3 0.099 0.102 0.098 0.098 
 
0.033 0.035 0.031 0.030 
 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
          Constant 86.224 1.677*** 2.294** 0.172 
 
61.734 -0.012 0.585 -6.044 
 
(62.189) (0.407) (0.711) (3.316) 
 
(71.980) (0.486) (0.799) (3.270) 
          R2 0.151 0.150 0.151 0.152 
 
0.059 0.058 0.060 0.063 





Appendix E. Joint F Tests  
Table E.1. Joint F Tests for Total Entrée, Total Fruit, and Total Vegetable 
 xxxxxx Model 
  (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) xxx (4) xxx (5) xxx (6) xxx (7) 
Total Entree               
  Income  15.741***  9.261***  2.091**  -  -  0.733  - 
               
  Eligible  -  -  -  12.238***  2.805**  -  2.120* 
               
  Race  1.178  1.146  1.220  0.543  0.551  1.225  0.246 
               
  Urbanicity  2.231*  2.411**  2.376**  1.712  1.686  0.516  0.552 
               
  Region  12.037***  11.764***  12.118***  12.876***  11.518***  6.309***  6.247*** 
               
  Month  1.771  1.968  1.982  1.501  1.705  2.046  2.840* 
               
Total Fruit               
  Income  1.677  4.142**  1.295  -  -  0.423  - 
               
  Eligible  -  -  -  6.283***  1.194  -  0.277 
               
  Race  1.046  1.060  0.980  1.367  0.973  0.203  0.529 
               
  Urbanicity  2.266  2.243*  2.512*  1.961  2.005  0.864  0.614 
               
  Region  1.697  1.740  1.914  2.051*  1.939  0.940  0.699 
               
  Month  2.407*  2.404*  2.370*  2.642*  2.483*  2.894**  3.329** 
               
continued… 
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Table E.1 (continued). Joint F Tests for Total Entrée, Total Fruit, and Total Vegetable 
 xxxxxx Model 
  (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) xxx (4) xxx (5) xxx (6) xxx (7) 
Total Vegetable               
  Income  0.956  1.019  0.504  -  -  0.032  - 
               
  Eligible  -  -  -  3.767  0.982  -  0.861 
               
  Race  5.175***  5.478***  5.230***  3.486***  3.522***  1.577  1.507 
               
  Urbanicity  1.357  1.422  1.439  1.437  1.281  1.265  0.478 
               
  Region  5.939  6.627***  6.843***  6.859***  6.923***  8.588***  7.399*** 
               
  Month  0.402  0.381  0.364  0.466  0.382  1.808  1.655 
Notes: F jointly tests the hypothesis that coefficients for each variable are different than zero. Results from Models 1-7 can be found in Tables 3.6 – 3.12. 




Appendix F. School Menu Example  
 
Figure F.1. School Lunch Menu, March 2013   
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Appendix G. Entrée Nutritionals 























Barbeque on whole grain bun 357.0 14.5 901.0 22.0 34.0 2.63% 6 1,226.2 
Cheese or pepperoni pizza on whole grain crust† 310.0 13.0 540.0 20.0 29.0 1.69% 2 2,365.5 
Cheese pizza on whole grain crust 310.0 12.0 490.0 21.0 31.0 7.35% 10 2,056.2 
Chicken alfredo with whole grain roll 579.0 25.3 730.0 34.5 51.5 0.36% 1 1,013.0 
Chicken chunks with honey mustard sauce  
     & whole grain roll† 438.5 22.8 917.5 21.5 38.0 0.74% 1 2,073.0 
Chicken chunks with honey mustard sauce† 348.5 21.5 762.5 18.0 21.5 0.76% 1 2,138.0 
Chicken nuggets with honey mustard sauce  
     & whole grain roll† 416.0 23.3 811.0 18.5 35.5 2.81% 3 2,620.3 
Chicken nuggets with honey mustard sauce† 326.0 22.0 656.0 15.0 19.0 8.99% 8 3,144.3 
Chicken sandwich on whole grain bun† 316.5 11.5 727.5 19.5 36.0 10.58% 10 2,960.3 
Deli sliced turkey on whole grain bun† 146.5 2.2 494.0 13.0 18.1 0.62% 4 430.3 
Enchilada pie with whole grain roll 445.0 15.5 1087.0 16.5 59.0 0.12% 2 169.0 
Fish nuggets with tarter sauce† 225.0 11.5 505.0 13.0 18.5 0.24% 2 337.5 
Grilled cheese with chicken noodle soup† 360.0 14.0 1301.0 21.0 37.0 2.44% 3 2,277.3 
Grilled cheese with vegetable soup† 308.0 12.0 1069.0 14.0 33.0 1.40% 2 1,960.5 
Grilled cheese† 250.0 11.0 700.0 11.0 27.0 1.87% 3 1,747.0 
Hamburger on whole grain bun† 291.5 12.0 509.5 22.5 23.0 6.57% 7 2,627.0 




























Hot ham & cheese on whole grain bun† 290.0 13.5 1000.0 18.0 23.0 0.31% 1 880.0 
Italian spaghetti† 306.0 6.3 345.0 21.3 39.5 1.30% 3 1,211.3 
Italian spaghetti with garlic toast† 386.0 7.3 450.0 24.3 55.5 0.52% 1 1,467.0 
Macaroni and cheese bake with whole grain roll 463.0 19.3 1283.0 27.5 43.5 0.81% 4 568.8 
Mandarin orange chicken rice bowl† 284.0 5.5 422.5 14.0 41.5 0.40% 1 1,108.0 
Mexican beef soft tacos with trimmings 453.0 17.3 616.0 22.5 22.0 4.24% 5 2,370.4 
Mozzarella cheese sticks with marinara sauce† 287.0 10.3 800.0 17.7 34.5 0.39% 1 1,102.0 
Nachos with chili and cheese 304.0 17.0 942.0 23.5 23.0 5.88% 8 2,056.9 
Pizzatas 360.0 21.0 930.0 18.0 26.0 3.43% 4 2,396.5 
Popcorn chicken with honey mustard sauce  
     and whole grain roll† 413.0 23.3 1114.0 15.5 36.5 3.71% 4 2,593.3 
Popcorn chicken with honey mustard sauce† 323.0 22.0 959.0 12.0 20.0 2.40% 3 2,238.3 
“Rib-b-q” on whole grain bun 420.0 25.5 790.0 18.0 27.0 1.18% 3 1,097.3 
Scrambled eggs, grits, sausage patty† 351.0 20.1 527.0 25.0 17.5 1.76% 2 2,457.0 
Stuffed baked potato with  
     ham and cheese and crackers† 335.0 12.0 1220.0 21.0 36.0 1.07% 3 999.7 
Stuffed baked potato with chili and cheese 264.0 10.0 837.0 12.5 32.0 0.34% 1 960.0 
Stuffed crust dippers with marinara sauce 340.0 14.3 1005.0 19.0 29.5 5.36% 5 2,997.2 
Teriyaki dippers over brown rice† 286.5 10.0 623.0 17.0 29.5 1.73% 5 970.0 
Turkey and gravy over brown rice 220.0 10.0 770.0 17.0 26.0 1.17% 5 654.6 
Turkey pot pie with whole grain roll 380.0 12.3 887.0 23.5 39.5 0.77% 5 432.0 



























Mean 339.5 14.9 782.8 18.8 31.9 - 3 1,613.2 
Standard Deviation 79.5 5.9 254.4 4.9 10.1 - 10.5 855.4 
Minimum 146.5 2.2 345.0 11.0 17.5 0.12% 1 169.0 
Maximum 579.0 25.5 1301.0 34.5 59.0 12.46% 66 3,144.3 
Weighted Average  334.5 15.4 722.3 18.5 29.9 - - - 
Notes: There are 279,698 total transactions. Weighted average is weighted by the percent of total sales. Pizzatas are mozzarella cheese, 
pepperoni, and marinara sauce wrapped in pizza crust (Rich’s Food Service 2011b). Rib-b-q is a boneless, chopped pork rib patty 
(AdvancePierre Foods 2013). Stuffed crust dippers are mozzarella cheese wrapped in pizza crust (Rich’s Food Service 2011a) and served 
with marinara sauce. Monthly menus did not consistently list which dipping sauce was offered with each entrée. After consultation with 
the district Food Services, the authors assumed bite-sized chicken entrees were served with honey mustard sauce, fish nuggets served with 
tartar sauce, and stuffed crust dippers and mozzarella sticks served with marinara sauce. For food items supplied by multiple vendors, 
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